DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 057 910 24 PS 005 204

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TITLE The Assessment of "Self-Concept" in Early Childhood Education. (Revised Edition).
INSTITUTION ERIC Clearinghouse on Early Childhood Education, Urbana, Ill.
SPONS AGENCY National Center for Educational Communication (DHEW/OE), Washington, D.C. Division of Information Resources.; Office of Child Development (DHEW), Washington, D.C.
BUREAU NO BR-0-0288
PUB DATE Jul 71
CONTRACT OEC-0-70-2623(519)
NOTE 93p.; ED 050 822 is an earlier version of this paper

EDRS PRICE MF-$0.65 HC-$3.29
DESCRIPTORS *Early Childhood; Identification (Psychological); *Literature Reviews; Motivation; Observation; *Personality Tests; *Self Concept; *Self Concept Tests; Self Congruence; Self Esteem

ABSTRACT

This paper on self concepts of young children is divided into 3 parts. Part 1 reviews the extensive and confusing literature of self theory. Self concept is viewed as a generic construct composed of a number of evaluative and descriptive components, with phenomenal and nonphenomenal components viewed as part of the model. In the second part of the paper more than 50 currently available instruments purported to assess the self concept of young children are described and classified according to the subdivisions of 5 major assessment approaches. It is anticipated that the categorization schema of this paper will be useful in the management of any large quantity of test information. Suggestions are made to indicate which testing approaches deserve further scrutiny. Part 3 included observations and suggestions: (1) Although no definition has been widely accepted, self concept must be operationally defined as that construct or set thereof assessed by the set of self concept instruments (2) It is inappropriate to attempt to validate a self concept measure by simply comparing it with another such measure. (3) The bulk of currently available self concept tests is not likely to be of significant value of the educator concerned either with the development or modification of specific educational programs for young children. (Author/AJ)

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(519)

THE ASSESSMENT OF "SELF-CONCEPT" IN EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION*

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July 1971

*This paper was produced pursuant to a contract with the Office of Education, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare and a grant from the Office of Child Development. Contractors undertaking such projects under Government sponsorship are encouraged to express freely their professional judgment. Points of view or opinions stated do not, therefore, necessarily represent official Government position or policy. Contract OCD-05-70-166

*The author is indebted to numerous persons for their thoughtful criticisms of an earlier draft of this paper, especially Stanley Coopersmith, J. Thomas Hastings, Gordon Hoke, Lilian Katz, Thomas Kearns, Estelle Peisach, and Barak Rosenshine. Aggie Wild and Florence Charlton assisted in locating various measures, Dorothy O'Connell provided editorial assistance, and Mildred Goff typed the several drafts.

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The Assessment of "Self-Concept" in Early Childhood Education

Alan R. Coller

The perplexing plethora of papers and other literature that refers in some way to the construct self has been accumulating from before the birth of Christ and, at least, since the time of the Homeric writings (600-800 BC).[1] The ancient Greeks distinguished between the physical human body and some nonphysical entity or function, which was later translated into English to mean either "psyche,""soul," or "spirit" (Diggory, 1966). It wasn't until late in the last century that the concept of soul was finally expurgated from psychological investigation and the construct self (or ego) came into prominence. Self has been construed by theorists in many exotic ways. Allport (1943), for example, listed eight ways in which self had been conceived; viz: (1) as knower, (2) as object of knowledge, (3) as primordial selfishness, (4) as dominator, (5) as a passive organizer and rationalizer, (6) as a fighter for ends, (7) as one segregated behavioral system among others, and (8) as a subjective patterning of cultural values.[2]

Most contemporary theorists define "self" either as a group of psychological processes that govern behavior and adjustment, and/or as an organized collection of attitudes, beliefs, and feelings a person has about himself. The first of these current meanings may be called the "self-as-subject" definition. According to this definition self is viewed as that "part of the person...which carries out psychic, mental, or psychological acts; the agent for behavior (as distinguished from psychological activities)" (English and English, 1958, p. 485). It is also called the "self-as-process" definition; self in this context is treated as a "doer, in the sense that it consists of

an active group of processes such as thinking, remembering, and perceiving" (Hall and Lindzey, 1970, p. 516). Terms that are essentially-equivalent in meaning to the self-as-subject construct include: James' I or pure ego (1961, p. 43); Dewey's ego (1891, p. 1); and Jung's self (Progoff, 1953, p. 152). Freud (1953) originally wrote of the "Ich"--the I, which later was translated into English as the ego. Ego-psychologists (neo-Freudian) sometimes equate ego with self, though the term "self" still retains the self-as-subject meaning (Hartmann, 1964, p. 287). A second definition is called "self-as-object" definition, since it denotes the person's attitudes, feelings, perceptions, and evaluations of himself as an object. In this sense, the self is what a person thinks of himself (Hall and Lindzey, 1970, p. 516). The term "self-concept," generally attributed to Raimy (1948) -- hereafter to be spelled: "selfconcept"[3] -- commonly has been used to refer to this second definition. Other terminology also has been employed. For example, James' me or empirical self (1961, p. 43); Cooley's social self (1902, p. 147); McDougall's self-regarding sentiment (1960, p. 155); Jung's conscious ideal (Progoff, 1953, p. 84); Adler's self ideal (Ansbacher and Ansbacher, 1956, p. 233); Koffka's phemonal ego (1953, p. 40); Sullivan's personification (Hall and Lindzey, 1970, p. 122); Munroe's self-image (1955, p. 609); McClelland's symbolized portion of the self schema (1951, p. 544) all, more or less, correspond to the self-as-object (or selfconcept) definition. Some theorists have posited selfconcepts "which are partially or entirely unavailable to awareness" (Wylie, 1968, p. 730). The body image of Fisher and Cleveland (1958); Horney's idealized image (1945, p. 96); and McClelland's unsymbolized portion of the self schema (1951, p. 544) are all cases in point. (For a more comprehensive treatment of these terms see Wylie (1968) and Hall and Lindzey (1970).)

Wylie (1968) has indicated that the dichotomization of self into self-as-subject and self-as-object is "an inadequate basis for classifying the self constructs used by personality theorists" (p. 730). She provides three major arguments: (1) some theorists sometimes attribute properties of the self-as-subject definition to the selfconcept (2) some theorists postulate constructs (e.g. Koffka's ego (1935, p. 40) Horney's real self (1942, p. 290) and Combs'and Snygg's phenomenal self (1959, p.44))which seem to involve both definitions of self, and (3) the definitions cannot meaningfully be related to constructs such as motivation and learning, etc. No alternative definitions were provided for by Wylie.

Nevertheless, her criticism of self literature is cogent here. Wylie wrote, "Any given theorist, often seems to include several quite disparate ideas under one 'self'-referent label, while using several different labels to indicate what appears to be the same idea. Moreover, there is no consistency in usage among theorists" (p. 729). That this statement is all too true is evidenced by both an examination of the previous pages and of the lexicon of Standard American English which is replete with references to self: I, me, mine, my, and myself occur frequently in everyday conversations. In a less obvious way, psychological and sociological constructs such as: actor agent, ego, individual, mind, object, organism, person, personality, proprium, psyche, role, social, spirit, subject, and others too numerous to list here are connected historically and theoretically to the concept of self.[4] We'll have occasion to examine some of these terms in more detail in the pages to follow.

Basically, this paper is concerned with selfconcept and its assessment, especially in early childhood education. The first section of the paper

examines historically some of the more important theoretical highlights that pertain to both self-as-subject and self-as-object definitions of self. In the second section over fifty different assessment techniques purported to be designed to assess selfconcept in young children (below the 4th grade) are classified and then briefly described and discussed.[5] Finally, some remarks of a psychometric nature are made and suggestions for improving evaluation efforts re selfconcept in early childhood education are offered.

I. SELF: HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHTS

In the early 1890's, while Wundt was attacking the notion of soul, William James, the ubiquitous philosopher and psychologist, brought the topic of self to the attention of American social scientists. Like Descartes,[6] Kant, and Schopenhauer before him, James (1961) referred to the usual distinction between "the self as known, or the me, the 'empirical ego'...and...the self as knower, or the I, the 'pure ego'" (p. 43). James believed that a man's me, which he subdivided into three constituent classes, "is the sum total of all that he CAN call his" (p. 44). The material me included man's body, his clothes, family, home, possessions, and works. The social me was thought to be the recognition a man receives from others. But, more importantly, James believed that man "has as many different social selves as there are distinct groups of persons about whose opinion he cares" (p. 46). By the spiritual me, he referred to the active-feeling states of consciousness: "the entire collection of my states of consciousness, my psychic faculties and dispositions" (p. 48). The I, for James, was the stream of thought that constitutes one's sense of personal identity: "that which at any given moment is conscious...

the me is only one of the things which it is conscious of" (p. 62). The I is "the thinker...a permanent substance or agent...'Soul,' 'transcendental Ego,' 'Spirit'" (p. 63). James, in effect, felt that it was sufficient to admit that knowing goes on. A separate knowing-ego was, for him, not a necessary assumption (Allport, 1943).

James, and a number of his distinguished contemporaries, including Titchener, Royce, Dewey, Cooley, and McDougall felt the need to posit a self or ego as a conception without which psychological theory just wouldn't make much sense (Sarbin, 1951). There was, however, considerable disagreement among these thinkers as to the nature of the self, how the self is developed, and its function in various psychological processes.[7] Titchener, for example, focused upon the pure ego, the I in Jamesian terminology; while Cooley and McDougall concerned themselves mainly with the empirical self, the me. Titchener described the self as that "particular combination of talent, temperament and character--of intellectual, emotive and active mental constitution--that makes up an individual mind" (1923, p. 544). For Dewey (1891), the ego, or what James called the "pure ego," was that aspect of self that "has the power of recognizing itself as I, or a separate existence or personality" (p. 1). He indicated that the self as subject "holds together all feelings, purposes, and ideas; and serves to differentiate the self from object" (p. 1). And, following in the tradition of Descartes,[8] Dewey argued that the self was a fact of consciousness: "The self not only exists, but may know that it exists;...the soul not only is, and changes, but it knows that it is, and what these experiences are which it passes through. It exists for itself. That is to say, it is a self" (p. 2). So absorbed was

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Dewey with self that he defined psychology as the "science of the facts or phenomena of self" (1891, p. 1). It was not Dewey's intention that this definition would provide a clear and complete notion of the content of the science, for as he reasoned, "it is the business of psychology to clear up and develop what is meant by the facts of self" (p. 1).[9]

One of the earliest theorists to treat the self in a naturalistic fashion, Cooley (1902) dealt exclusively with the empirical self (what James called the "me") and not at all with the metaphysical self or pure ego. By the empirical self Cooley meant "the self that can be apprehended or verified by ordinary observation" (p. 136). He defined self as "that which is designated in common speech by the pronouns of the first person singular, 'I,' 'me,' 'mine,' and 'myself'" (p. 136). Cooley's I is a conscious, cognizant I: the I of daily speech and thought, it does not refer to the I of the self-as-subject definition. The pronoun "I" refers, stated Cooley, "chiefly to opinions, purposes, desires, claims, and the like concerning matters that involve no thought of the body" (p. 144).[10]

On the basis of his observations of children, Cooley felt that the instinctive self-feeling appears to be associated "chiefly with ideas of the exercise of power" (p. 146). The child, he argued, first attempts to control "visible objects--his limbs, his playthings, his bottle, and the like. Then he attempts to control the persons about him" (p. 146). The self-feeling, recognized by acts of appropriation, always is present in the individual, even from the earliest moments of life. The pronouns "I" and "me" are developed in the child "at first only with those ideas regarding which his appropriate feeling is aroused and defined by opposition"

(p. 162). The communicative use of these pronouns allows the child to name the experience of the vague emotion of self and thus ultimately leads to a more concrete image of the phenomena of appropriation.

In adult life these pronouns are "applied with a strongsense of their meaning only to things distinguished as peculiar to us by some sort of opposition or contrast. They always imply social life and relation to other persons" (p. 162). It was this latter conception that caused Cooley to become concerned with the social self, which he defined as "any idea, or system of ideas drawn from the communicative life, that the mind cherishes as its own" (p. 147). Cooley emphasized the social self because he believed that the I of common language "always has more or less distinct reference to other people as well as the speaker" (p. 137). "Our personality," he suggested, "grows and takes form by devining the appearance of our present self to other minds" (p. 176).[11]

McDougall, like James and Cooley, believed that the idea of the self and the self-regarding sentiment (a generic term for a variety of concepts related to self-valuation) are essentially social products, and that their development is effected by constant interplay between personalities and between the self and society: "The complex conception of self thus attained implies constant references to others and to society in general, and is, in fact, not merely a conception of self, but always of one's self in relation to other selves" (McDougall, 1960, p. 155).

In time, McDougall (1932) developed a comprehensive theory of personality that included a concept of the self-regarding sentiment. The base of the theory is composed of instincts, and is conceived of as being organized through learning into "systems which give consistency, continuity

and order to our life of striving and emotion; systems which in turn become organized in larger systems, and which, when harmoniously organized in one comprehensive system constitute what we properly call character" (p. 43). Self-sentiments, an intermediate order concept, were seen as deriving from the instincts and having cognitive and conative aspects.

George H. Mead, a social psychologist, has often been referred to as a "social behaviorist," a term which is intended to convey a relationship, though a distinctive one, to the Watsonian brand of behaviorism. Mead, like Cooley before him, was concerned with the development of self-awareness as a function of social interaction. "The self," he argued, "is something which has a development; it is not initially there at birth but arises in the process of social experience and activity, that is, develops in the given individual as a result of his relations to that process as a whole and to other individuals within that process" (Mead, 1956, p. 212).

However, Mead was really more interested in the process by which awareness of one's own attributes becomes translated into selfconcepts. Mead found the distinguishing trait of selfhood to reside in the capacity of the minded organism to be an object to itself (Mead, 1946). He agreed that "the word 'self,' which is a reflexive...indicates that which can be both subject and object" (Mead, 1956, pp. 213-214). But he argued that,

> The individual experiences himself as such, not directly, but only indirectly, from the particular standpoints of other individual members of the same social group, or from the generalized standpoint of the social group as a whole to which he belongs. For he enters his own experience as a self or individual, not directly or immediately, not by becoming a subject to himself, but only insofar as he first becomes an object to himself just as other individuals are objects to him or in his experience (Mead, 1956, p. 15).

Thus, insofar as an individual is capable of taking the role of another, he can, as it were, look back at himself from this new perspective, and so become an object to himself (Mead, 1946).

With some notable exceptions (Mead, for one; Calkins, for another)[12] scientific interest in this topic waned during the decades when the early behaviorists held sway over American psychology. Watson (1925), the most vocal of the behaviorists, argued persuasively that consciousness was neither observable nor measurable, and therefore was inappropriate for psychological study. At this time in American psychology, few self-respecting psychologists would treat self as a topic for serious experimental study. Self was a subject for armchair speculation, even sophistry, but not the laboratory: self was not behavior; it could not be observed directly.[13]

Theoretical interest in the self was not, however, universally dormant: In Europe, Freud, his followers, and his dissenters actively developed theories concerned with the nature of self (or ego). But the European psychologies, as well as those of the English-American, McDougall and the Americans, Cooley and Mead, were not to have an immediate effect upon the American scene. The publication of Allport's (1937) book on personality seems to have been the beginning of renewed American interest in self (Sarbin, 1952). In the late 1930's and early 40's neo-Freudians, self-theorists, and phenomenologists (some transplanted to American shores because of the pending European conflagration) were able to convince many American psychologists to attend more to the nature of self. Finally, Hilgard (1949) in his presidential address to the American Psychological Association convention lent his enormous prestige and support to efforts which attempted to better understand self.

The construct in Freudian theory which comes closest to what we now regard as self is what Freud called the "Ich"--the "I," the "ego." The Freudian ego, a self-as-subject ego, is a complex structure and can be

understood only in the context of Freudian psychology. To more closely approximate what he saw as the functional divisions of the mind; the structural units of the psyche, Freud developed a tripartite construct. These three institutions: the id, the ego, and the superego are to be viewed as concepts, abstractions that refer to specific behaviors.

In orthodox Freudian psychology, a portion of the id (which was viewed by Freud as devoid of reality and operating on the "pleasure principle") became differentiated into a new structure that is partly conscious. The new structure, called the "ego," operated on the "reality principle," whose function was to postpone the release of energy from the id, "...a chaos, a cauldron of seething excitement" (Freud, 1933, pp. 103-104), until the moment was appropriate. The ego thus was capable of behaviors which were delayable, brought about delay, or were themselves products of delay (Rapaport, 1959). To Freud the ego was the attending, the orienting part of the mental life of the individual. It is the <u>who I am</u>, the <u>what I am doing</u> aspect. Its role is to solve problems, think, plan, structure, and erect defenses to protect itself.[14]

Another major institution, the superego, was conceived by Freud as composed of two subsystems; the conscience and the ego-ideal. The superego may be said to be composed of a set of response predispositions learned by the individual through experiences in the outer world. A product of culture, it was seen as a complex structure built from identifications with parents, teachers, and society, in general, and is representative of moral restrictions. The superego represents the ideal rather than the real and motivates the individual to strive for perfection rather than to strive for pleasure or reality.

But, Freudian theory conceived of the inner mental world of the individual as if it were a battleground. For example, Anna Freud (1946) spoke of instinctual impulses that made "hostile incursions into the ego, in the hope of overthrowing it by a surprise-attack" (pp. 7-8). Thus, the ego was viewed as seeking to maintain its integrity and its sometimes uneasy, precarious balance among the three protagonists: itself, the id, and the superego. In the mentally healthy individual the relationships between these three potential combatants is a harmonious one. In the disturbed or maladjusted individual these forces are in conflict with one another.[15]

Alfred Adler, one of the charter members and later the president of Freud's Vienna Psychoanalytic Society developed concepts which were sometimes at variance with those proposed by Freud. After several especially heated debates, Adler resigned from the society and formed his own group. Adler's "Individual Psychology," in contrast with theories that pictured the person as composed of different parts, processes, and mechanisms (e.g., Freudian theory), was one that believed in the holistic nature of man: the belief that individual behavior cannot be explained adequately by any partial process.[16] He argued that the behavior of individuals is motivated and directed by the unity of personality. This unity he called the "life style." Behavior, Adler argued, is not caused by an influence to which the person has been exposed, but rather by his intentions, his concepts, his beliefs, and his expectations as they relate to the immediate situation. It is the person's perceptions, his <u>fictions</u> concerning the world and himself, that determine his behavior more than the so-called reality of the situation. Thus, according to Adler, to predict how a person will behave, we need to know his general outlook on life and the basic assumptions on which he operates; in short, his

fictions. These assumptions and concepts are integrated into a basic pattern called the life style which is developed by a continual interaction between the environment and its evaluation as determined by the individual.[17]

The "neo-Freudian" theories of Anna Freud (1936), Hartmann (1939), Erickson (1937) essentially are extensions of the psychoanalytic concepts of Freud. These psychologists sometimes called ego-psychologists had a somewhat different conception of the ego than did Freud.[18] For example, ego psychologists hold that the ego can be autonomous. Rapaport (1958) believed "...that while man's behavior is determined by drive forces which originate in him, it is not totally at their mercy since it has a certain independence from them." He suggested that "...the ego, which arises in the course of life's struggles, can become unlike the original impulses--can be relatively autonomous from them--and can control them." Rapaport also believed that man may achieve relative autonomy from his environment; i.e., he need not respond to environmental situations. In general, psychoanalytic ego psychologists believe that the self does not arise from the energies of the id. Instead, both the id and the ego arise by differentiation from a common undifferentiated matrix, wherein the apparatuses for ego behavior (i.e., memory, motor activity, perceptual ability, etc.) are already present.

The social psychological theories of Horney (1937), Fromm (1937), and Sullivan (1938, 1940) were somewhat influenced by the theories of both Adler and Freud. Horney and Fromm are sometimes referred to a neo-Freudians but Sullivan as a theorist was highly original (Hall and Lindzey, 1970, p. 119).

Harry Stack Sullivan, a self-theorist, was concerned with the development of self in relationship to the significant others in the child's environment. In his writings, Sullivan tried to show how the social world (of which one,

of necessity, must be a part) remains influential in effecting behavior even when one is physically alone (Mullahy, 1965). Sullivan (1953) argued that man is a sociocultural being, and that from the time he is born until the time he can care for himself, he must be cared for by others; others must satisfy his needs. It is from his early experiences in the satisfaction of these needs that the child develops certain basic attitudes of trust or distrust, sometimes referred to as security or insecurity (Dinkmeyer, 1965).

Sullivan argued strongly that some of the attitudes of those persons responsible for mothering the child are conveyed to the child through the operation of empathy (i.e., a means of emotional communication). Thus, if the mother were concerned about her health, for example, such anxiety would be communicated to the child.[19] The image that an individual has of himself or of another person was called by Sullivan a "personification." Self-personifications are complexes of feelings attitudes, and conceptions that grow out of experiences with need-satisfaction and anxiety (Hall and Lindzey, 1970, p. 142). In general, the basic components of personifications (or selfconcept) are produced, according to Sullivan, from the reflected appraisals of significant others in the individual's life (Dinkmeyer, 1965).

Raimy (1948) is to be credited for introducing the term "self-concept" in relation to clinical work. He defined the term as "the more or less organized perceptual object resulting from present and past self-observation" (p. 154). Raimy conceived of selfconcept as the "map which each person consults in order to understand himself, especially during moments of crisis or choice" (1948, p. 155).

More comprehensive treatments of selfconcept are found in the phenomenological-like theories of Rogers and of Combs and Snygg. Rogers (1951) developed a theory of personality that was basically phenomenological in

character and relied upon the construct of self as an explanatory concept. The organism, psychologically conceived, is the locus of all experience. The totality of experience, which includes everything potentially available to awareness, constitutes the phenomenal field. The phenomenal field is the individual's frame of reference and can only be known to the person himself. How the individual behaves depends on the phenomenal field and not upon the stimulating conditions (Hall and Lindzey, 1970). Gradually, a portion of the phenomenal field becomes differentiated and is referred to by Rogers as the self or selfconcept. The selfconcept consists of all the perceptions of self admissible to awareness and contains, for example, one's perception of his characteristics and abilities. It is, says Rogers, "the organized, consistent conceptual gestalt composed of perceptions of the characteristics of the 'I' or 'me' and the perceptions of the relationships of the 'I' or "me' to others and to various aspects of life, together with the values attached to these perceptions" (1959, p. 200).

Combs and Soper (1957) defined the selfconcept as "the organization of all that the individual refers to as 'I' or 'me'...a patterned relationship or 'gestalt.'" Combs and Snygg (1959) whose theorizing is closely associated with that of Rogers, discussed concepts of self which they defined as "those more or less discrete perceptions of self which the individual regards as part, or characteristic of his being" (p. 42). The phenomenal self is represented as including "not only a person's physical self but everything he experiences as 'me' at that instant" (p. 44). They argued that we all have thousands of perceptions about ourselves in different situations, and all perceptions of the self a person has at a particular instant are called the "phenomenal self." What a person thinks and how he behaves are governed almost entirely by the

concepts (the self-perceptions) he holds about himself and his abilities at any given time. "The self," they argued, "can only be understood through somebody's perceptions" (p. 123).

A number of alternate definitions of selfconcept exist: Strong and Feder (1961) argued that: "Every evaluative statement that a person makes concerning himself can be considered a sample of his self-concept, from which inferences may then be made about the various properties of that self-concept" (p. 170). Bills, Vance, and McLean (1951) defined the selfconcept at "the traits and values which the individual has accepted as definitions of himself" (p. 257). Perkins (1958) likewise argued that at the base of self-concept are those perceptions, beliefs, feelings, and values that one takes as descriptive of himself. Jersild (1952) conceived of selfconcept or self as a "composite of thoughts and feelings which constitute a person's awareness of his individual existence; his conception of who and what he is" (p. 51). Helper (1954) has defined selfconcept as "all of the individual's covert responses to his socially given identity symbols" (p. 18). Kinch (1963) saw the selfconcept as "that organization of qualities that the individual attributes to himself" (p. 481). By qualities he meant both attributes and roles.

Close inspection of these definitions reveals that selfconcept should really be regarded as a generic term for a set of concepts of self that involve aspects of <u>self-evaluation</u> and/or <u>self-description</u>; appropriately, the connotative and denotative attributes of meaning.[20] The subcomponents of self-evaluation include <u>self-appraisal</u> and <u>self-regard</u>. <u>Self-appraisal</u> involves "an explicit valuing of one's good and bad points" (English and English, 1958, p. 486). <u>Self-regard</u> was used by Wylie (1961) as a generic term "to include self-satisfaction, self-acceptance, self-esteem, self-favorability, congruence between self and ideal self, and discrepancies between self and ideal self" (p. 40). These terms, however, are not synonymous. Coopersmith

(1967) defined self-esteem as the "evaluation which the individual makes and customarily maintains with regard to himself: it expresses an attitude of approval or disapproval, and indicates the extent to which the individual believes himself to be capable, significant, successful, and worthy. In short, self-esteem is a personal judgment of worthiness that is expressed in the attitudes the individual holds toward himself" (pp. 4-5). Crowne and Stephens (1961) assumed that self-acceptance is the "degree of self-satisfaction in self-evaluation" (p. 104). Wylie indicated that for some authors, "self-acceptance means respecting one's self, including one's admitted faults, while self-esteem or congruence between self and ideal self means being proud of one's self or evaluating one's attributes highly" (1961, p. 40).

The subcomponents of self-description are self-image and self-awareness. Self-image is defined as "the self one thinks oneself to be. This is...a complex concept: of one's personality, character, status, body and bodily appearance, etc. It may differ greatly from objective fact" (English and English, 1958, p. 487)."Self-awareness" has been defined as "knowledge of one's own traits or qualities; insight into, and understanding of, one's own behavior and motives" (English and English, 1958, p. 486). Wylie (1961) claimed that most operational definitions of self-awareness (she uses the term "insight") involve a discrepancy between a person's self-report and the report of an observer (O) concerning that person. Another type of self-awareness measurement has employed direct inferences by O. That is, O is asked to rate the person as to how self-aware that person is concerning a given set of characteristics.

An overview of the dimensional components of selfconcept is presented in Figure 1. (Clearly, the breakdown of the evaluative and descriptive com-

FIGURE 1. Some Components of the Selfconcept.



This model of the components of what we mean by selfconcept is incomplete. Some measures of selfconcept are really concerned with the question of whether the child even has a selfconcept. This and other developmental questions would expand considerably the list of components of selfconcept.

ponents of selfconcept are very general; they are much too inclusive. However, we leave it to others to provide further differentiation and elaboration.) Aside from evaluative and descriptive dimensions selfconcept has both phenomenal (conscious) and nonphenomenal (unconscious) aspects. Some theorists even seem to imply that the nonphenomenal selfconcept is more potent than the phenomenal selfconcept in determining behavior. Such theorists argue that much important learning occurs preverbally (e.g.,Sullivan, 1953), and that the need to maintain self-esteem will lead to repression and denial (e.g., Anna Freud, 1946) (Wylie, 1961). Selfconcept is not a unitary concept, and thus it is inappropriate to treat a person as if he held only one selfconcept: "To think of this person as having a high, low, or average self-concept, in general, would ignore relevant characteristics of the student" (Brookover and Erickson, 1969, p. 101). Hence, we speak of the selfconcept of a person in respect to either a set of attributes (e.g., dominance, height, etc.) or roles (e.g., father, psychologist, student, etc.).

Indeed, Bookover and Erickson (1969) even suggested that "self-conceptions... vary with the situation. A student may feel quite able to read with his peers in class while also believing that he is unable to read in front of a large group of parents" (p. 103). While such a notion has logical appeal, there also has to be a limit to specificity; that is, if we are to have a science of selfconcept. Lecky (1969), for example, argued that "the doctrine of specificity is...itself a prediction that behavior relationships are predictable" (p. 59). It follows that if we are to make separate measurements of selfconcepts for each discrete situation we have a very awkward science.

Selfconcept, as broadly conceived, is a <u>multidimensional construct that covers and includes the total range of one's perceptions and evaluations of</u>

himself (Creelman, 1954). We have as many selfconcepts as we have organized sets of attributes and roles (or situations). Thus, it is not necessarily appropriate to speak of the selfconcept or of a person's selfconcept, except as a convenience, after that aspect of selfconcept under scrutiny has been defined. On the other hand, it is possible, though probably not too useful, to speak of a "global selfconcept."

A clarification of what is meant by self and particularly selfconcept has been attempted in this section. That these are complex concepts has been amply demonstrated. Ruth Wylie's comments are appropriate here:

> The scientific utility of a term such as self (or more specifically selfconcept) is vitiated when various psychologists who employ it do not offer even literary or denotative definitions, let alone operational ones, but instead simply talk about the construct to which they wish to assign the specified label (1968, p. 729).

Self-as-subject definitions of self admittedly are more metaphysical than are self-as-object definitions, but both are equally obfuscating. Of course, this can console neither educators (who must design educational programs to somehow affect selfconcepts of children) nor test constructors or evaluators (who must develop instruments to assess the effects of education). Eventually, clearer operational definitions for the various components of selfconcept must be developed if educators and test constructors are to succeed at their assignments.

II. APPROACHES TO THE ASSESSMENT OF SELF-CONCEPT IN CHILDREN

The child, a product of heritable predispositions and of innumerable distinctive social and physical encounters, is truly a unique being. His

idioconceptual structures (i.e., those unique conceptions one has about the world and himself as part of that world) and more particularly, his self-conceptions have been shaped (and too often buffeted) by those many encounters. Thus, while some of the content of his self-conceptions is shared universally by others, most is singularly different. In short, no two children are exactly alike, nor can they ever be, and attempts to understand the individual child should reflect this fundamental assumption. To appreciate fully why any given child behaves as he does we should like to get inside of him to examine, in detail, all that which constitutes his self. But, even abetted by the most sophisticated technology available, the observer--the outsider--is physically unable to enter the mind of a child to sense directly all his feelings and thoughts. The self or the selfconcept can only be inferred by direct observation of behavior as it emerges or by an examination of the traces of behavior after it has occurred. These two processes are fundamental to all the assessment techniques discussed in this section.[21]

The model displayed in Figure 2, adopted from one offered by Gordon (1968), provides a highly general (though tentative) method of viewing how the child's self may be assessed. The model indicates that the assessment of selfconcept may be approached by the use of any one of five general procedures: direct observations, behavioral traces, self-reports, projective techniques and/or by any combination of these. In turn, these major assessment categories can be, and have been, further subdivided. (See Table 1 below.) The classification schema finally adopted represents a modification of the systems proposed by Campbell (1963) and Sechrest (1968) for behavioral dispositions and the schemata proposed by Campbell (1957) for personality measures and by Lindzey (1961) for projective techniques. The factor system



Figure 2

A general model for the assessment of Self

The circle represents all that is meant by Self and includes self-as-object definitions (i.e., selfconcept). The diamond shape in the center represents Self as assessed by any combination of four distinct procedures: Direct Observation, Behavioral Traces, Self-Reports, and Projective Techniques.

proposed by Cattell and Warburton (1967) could not easily be employed here. The categorical system selected for this paper should be regarded as suggestive, since it is only one of many ways in which the materials to follow may be classified and described. The present system reflects nothing more than an attempt to provide a means by which an enormous amount of information can be more easily digested by the reader. We would hope that the future will bring a better system. In the 16 sections which follow most of the currently available selfconcept instruments that have been employed to assess selfconcept in children up to and inculding the third grade are briefly described. Most of the instruments located were still in the developmental form and psychometric data were either not readily accessible or nonexistent. While some mention is made in reference to reliability and/or validity data, this was not the major concern of the paper and is glossed over.[22]

Although no great effort was expended to locate all studies that utilize the described measures, many reports became available and are summarized. Investigations whose foci were more on educational rather than theoretical concerns are generally covered in this paper.

A. Direct Observational Procedures

A fundamental characteristic of all direct observational procedures is their emphasis upon overt behavior, including expressive or coping behaviors that can be seen, heard, or otherwise perceived by the human or mechanical recorder. Covert behaviors, or the inner mental life of the child (his thoughts, beliefs, perceptions, attitudes, and feelings) are not directly observable and must be inferred from overt behaviors, or assessed by other means; e.g., self-report procedures. The fact that direct

Table 1

A Classification Schema for Selfconcept Assessment Techniques

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A. Direct Observational Procedures

1. Observations in unstructured environments
2. Observations in selected situations
3. Observations in contrived situations

B. Behavioral Trace Procedures

1. Physical tracings
2. Manifest and/or cloaked retrospective reports

C. Self-Report Procedures

1. Manifest and/or cloaked self-reports
2. Reports on symbolically contrived situations
3. Episodic recall

D. Projective Techniques

1. Cued associations
2. Cued constructions
3. Minimally-induced constructions
4. Completions
5. View of the stimulus through choice and/or ordering
6. Self-expression

E. Combinational Procedures

1. Observer as instrument
2. Subjective-behavioral comparisons

observational techniques relate to the recorder's perception of emergent behaviors and not to his impressions of past behavior serves to distinguish direct observational procedures from behavioral trace procedures.

Direct observational procedures may be concerned with behaviors as they occur either under naturalistic or controlled situations. Naturalistic observations are concerned mainly with viewing the child in his everyday environs (situations in which the child spends most of his time) where behavior can unfold naturally and are not influenced or caused by the observer. Often the observation is satisfied if the child is in at least familiar surroundings. Two of the techniques described below: observations in unstructured environments and observations in selected situations may be regarded as naturalistic observational techniques. The technique known as observations in contrived situations is a controlled observation technique. In controlled observations the environment is "subtly" modified by the observer in such a way that behavior of interest to the observer may be elicited from S (the child); Weick (1968) called this "tempered naturalness" (p. 367).

In general, direct observation procedures are especially useful for those young children who are unable to introspect, to employ language with facility, to perform complex test-related operations, or to remain attentive during lengthy testing situations.

1. Observations in unstructured environments are concerned with situations in which the child moves freely about his everyday environment, unrestricted by the observer. Such behavior is usually assessed by any number of different types of trailing techniques (Campbell, 1963), which is also referred to as specimen description techniques (Wright, 1960). These

techniques involve following the child and recording, usually in a detailed sequential narration, his predominant modes of response to various situations he encounters. A classic example of trailing techniques is found in One Boy's Day, an attempt by Barker and Wright (1951) to describe the behaviors of a child they and their collaborators followed for an entire day. It is also an interpretive record, because it contains inferences of the apparent meanings that the boy attaches to his behavior, and to the persons, things, and events that he encounters throughout the day.

The extremely high cost of employing observations in unstructured environments as an approach for the educational assessment of selfconcept is a fundamental factor for its infrequent use. Data collection, transcription, content analysis (required for the scoring of selfconcept), and several other steps in the chain all contribute to the overall cost. However, one may consider the possibility of applying inferential techniques (described later under observer as instrument approaches) to more easily and with less expense interpret such data. In addition, Fiske (1963) argued that "measurements based on observed responses in unstructured situations have low general utility" (p. 460).

2. Observations in selected situations refers to a class of techniques designed to assess behavior in given situations; e.g., in the classroom, in the playground, etc. Such procedures are employed because many interesting behaviors occur more frequently under certain conditions but seldom under other conditions. These techniques are thus typically concerned with specified sets of variables or dimensions of behavior but may also be nonspecific. Sampling procedures are often employed in this class of observation

procedures. Time sampling as a technique involves the distribution of observations over short, scheduled, and uniform time units. In incident or event sampling, the observer focuses on the occurrence or absence of behaviors of a given class. On-the-spot coding, narration, or both may be employed to collect such data (Wright, 1960). Anecdotal records or diary description methods may also be employed. The most frequently used technique appears to be behavior or trait rating scales that are designed especially to assess only a given set of behavioral dimensions. Measures (e.g., rating scales), which belong in this category and which are designed to assess selfconcept, are described below. Also, when available and appropriate, summaries of research studies that have employed the described instruments are included.

The Inferred Self-Concept Judgment Scale (McDaniel, 1967) required observers (usually teachers) to rate students on the degree of occurrence of a set of selfconcept related classroom behaviors. Several professional psychologists and educators evaluated, for their relevance to selfconcept, 100 statements that consisted of short behavioral descriptions; 37 items were selected for the final version of the instrument. The scale is a 5-point numerical/descriptive rating scale, ranging from "never" to "always." An image analysis of the scale items revealed two factors: self-conformance and self-attitude. In a research study that employed a pre- and posttest design, the teacher of each child involved in the study and school counselor were asked to independently rate a particular set of children on the items of the Inferred Self-Concept Judgment Scale (ISCJS). The procedure was repeated in 6 months. McDaniel reported that regardless of organismic variables (including race, sex, family size, birth order, and grade level), all low income culturally different children were

scored as having a positive selfconcept. Anglos revealed a selfconcept significantly different from Mexican-Americans but not significantly different from Negroes only in the fifth grade. For all groups combined, the selfconcept decreased significantly during the pre- and posttest interval.

A subscale of the Evaluation Scale (Butler, 1963), which may be called the Self-Concept Subscale (developed by Butler, Church, and Swayze), consists of six items. Each item assesses a different aspect of the self; e.g., awareness of self, feeling about self, progress toward self-sufficiency, involvement in task, openness to new experiences, and ability to relate to others. The continuum upon which the observer rates the child is composed of five points. Points 2 and 4 are described by a sentence or two.

'DiLorenzo (1969) describes the Teacher Measurement of Pupil Self-Concept, a paired-comparison type rating scale developed by staff of the New York State Education Department, Office of Research and Evaluation. The instrument contains three statements that describe how children see themselves as learners compared to peers, teachers, and classroom materials. The three items are defined by sets of behaviors and characteristics that reflect positive selfconcept. After she observes the children for a week, the teacher considers, not her estimate of the child's selfconcept, but rather the child's perception of his selfconcept. (For example, does the child see himself capable of certain critical behaviors?) Each child is then compared with every other child in the classroom, and judgments are made that concern whether or not one child has a higher self-image than another. A rank order of the children is obtained by this procedure. DiLorenzo reported that scores from this measure were compared with scores from a self-report

type procedure, and the correlation coefficient that resulted was significant, but low.

Thus far, none of the three measures described in this section has been validated adequately. For example, no psychometric data were found in the manual that described the Self-Concept Subscale; data collected by McDaniel for the ISCJS were insufficient for a proper evaluation; and, the Teacher Measurement of Pupil Self-Concept was developed primarily to validate another type of instrument (the Learner Self-Concept Test, described below under self-report procedures). Inter-rater reliability (which is always an issue when rating scales are employed) has not been investigated for any of these instruments. Rating scales will be especially useful to measure selfconcept when administered by teachers for the intragroup evaluation of young children whose responses in test situations cannot yet be trusted to reflect reliably the assessed construct. Perhaps some investigators will eventually develop behavioral checklist-type observational schedules.

3. Observations in contrived situations refer to techniques designed to assess behaviors in specially designed situations that are intended to elicit responses of interest. Weick (1968) indicated that there are several reasons why an investigator might decide to modify a natural setting; but basically it is because he cannot afford to just wait for something relevant to happen. Weick contended that subtle modification is the key to this technique: "massive interventions do render the familiar unfamiliar and make participants aware that they are being watched and that their actions are for the benefit of the investigators and not themselves" (p. 367). Techniques which employ massive

intervention are referred to here as self-expression measures and are described under the projective technique section. However, the boundary between this observation in contrived situations category and the projective technique self-expression is sometimes hard to distinguish. In practice, observations in contrived situations have been assessed by modifications of the environment that tend to preserve "the trappings of the natural event" (Weick, p. 367). In effect the response(s) required of the child appear to him to be natural to the situation; they are, suggested Weick "non-reactive," that is, they are "plausible and expected" (p. 367). Generally speaking, the true purpose of the modified situation which appears natural is hidden from the child, and he should not be aware that he is being observed for the sake of gathering data about his behavior. The opposite is often true of the self-expression techniques.

All of the techniques discussed in the preceding section may be employed in this situation. However, simple counts, checklists, and rating scales are more typically employed.

Work Posting, a technique developed by the staff of the Instructional Objective Exchange (1970), employs a rather simple contrived situation. The teacher merely announces the opportunity to post work after a lesson. This measure is based on the assumption that students with a positive selfconcept will want to display their work and will not hesitate to do so. On the other hand, a student with a negative selfconcept will not wish to expose his work to possible criticism. Another measure, the Perceived Approval Situation (Instructional Objectives Exchange, 1970), uses a similar approach. For this measure the teacher simply announces that there are a number of students

who are doing very well, but she doesn't want to call out their names. She then asks them to come to her after class so that she can speak to them. It is assumed that children with positive selfconcepts tend to sense approval of acceptance from authority figures and would therefore expect that the teacher refers to them.

The Doll-Self Test (DST) was developed by Pierce-Jones and Jones (1968) to assess awareness of self. Two dolls, one dark skinned, and the other light skinned, are placed in front of the child. The child is then presented with a series of drawings of parts of the body and is asked to "find another one that looks just like this." The child may either match the body part as presented in the drawing with the appropriate part of his own body or with the appropriate part of the doll's body. Each child receives a single score of "1" for each drawing in accord with whether he pointed on a majority of trials to himself or to the dolls. The authors argued that "to the extent that external or environmental sensitivity is replaced by sensitivity of self, we might expect greater awareness of self or a more differentiated self concept" (p. 62). In a study that involved the DST, Pierce-Jones and Jones hypothesized that culturally deprived preschool children entering a preschool program would display more sensitivity to the environment or to external stimuli than to themselves, as measured by the DST. They also predicted that, at the end of an enrichment program, children would be more introspective or sensitive to their own bodies than to external stimuli (the dolls). The results of a pre- and posttest design tended to confirm these hypotheses; however, the experimental design does not permit us to determine if the enrichment program itself contributed to these differences.

Neither the Work Posting (WP) nor the Perceived Approval Situation (PAS) tests has been validated and there are few data available to assess the DST. The relative simplicity of administration of the WP and PAS tests probably is the factor that makes them attractive, but it is essential to note that test constructors distrust single-item measures. Such objections are easily overcome by constructing similar types of observations in contrived situations, weighting them, and then combining them into a single weighted index of selfconcept.

B. Behavioral Trace Procedures

Behavioral trace procedures are mainly concerned with an examination of the trace, residue, or after-effect produced by a child's past responses and not with the direct observation of evolving behavior (Sechrest, 1968). In effect, the child is totally unaware that his behavior is being observed. It is in this respect that such measures may be treated as unobtrusive or nonreactive measures (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, and Sechrest, 1966). We can consider two major classes of behavioral trace procedures: physical and retrospective. Physical tracings refer to a class of techniques that entails the examination of changes in physical matter, either caused by the child himself (e.g., neatness of a "cubby"), or caused by others as a matter of procedure (e.g., comments on cumulative record cards). Retrospective trace reports are techniques employed to examine the memories or impressions that others have of the child and particularly the child's behavior. Sechrest (1968) suggested that there are certain dangers in inferring behavioral dispositions from behavioral traces rather than from direct observations. First, it is not always certain what behavior is reflected by the trace, and second,

memories are notoriously faulty due to the numerous opportunities for distortion. [See Weick (1968) for further discussion.]

1. Physical tracings as measurement approaches may be divided into three major types: erosion, accretion, and archival measures. Erosion measures reflect the selective wear on materials; e.g., wear on erasers, clothes, and books. Accretion (or trace) measures refer to an examination of deposited materials, e.g., drawings and quantities of "stars." Information on report cards; i.e., the running record, can be treated as accumulations of archival (or permanent data) that could conceivable be employed as a rough index of selfconcept.

Nimnicht (1970), for example, suggested that if the program he proposed "is successful in producing a better environment to help children develop or maintain a healthy self-concept, children in the program will: (1) attend school more frequently, [and] (2) be tardy less frequently" (p. 6). Both of these measures obviously can be garnered easily and reliably from record cards, an archival measure; or from direct observation procedures (though the latter approach probably would not be as accurate as the former).

If it is assumed that classroom rewards; e.g., stars, tokens, or high marks on tests are perceived by the child to indicate that "teacher likes him," then counts of accumulated rewards, an accretion or trace measure, also may be employed as a rough index of selfconcept.

Worn clothing, might theoretically be employed as a rough erosion-type measure of selfconcept.

In general, however, such measures do not appear to be especially useful. In many situations they probably could not discriminate well among some children, who, if assessed by other more reliable means, might show measurably different

selfconcepts. However, it is interesting to speculate whether some weighted combination of physical tracings and observations in contrived situations might not produce a more valid and reliable index of selfconcept than each measure taken singly.

2. Manifest and/or cloaked retrospective reports refer to a set of techniques that requires the respondent (a teacher, parent, peer, etc.) to search through his memory of a particular child and to report on that child's behavior. Such reports may be based on explicit memories or upon vague impressions. The purpose of the report need not be perfectly clear to the respondent. Manifest retrospective reports refers to a class of measures the testing objectives of which are not disguised and are apparent to the respondent. The testing objectives of cloaked retrospective reports are either intentionally or psychometrically disguised.[24] Most techniques that employ the manifest and/or cloaked retrospective reports approach involve interviewing or rating methods.

The Rating Scale for Measuring a Child's Self-Concept (FitzGibbon, 1970) required the teacher to rate each child for nine psychosocial factor areas along a 5-point scale that ranges from "high" to "low." The factor areas are defined in terms of observable behaviors, but teachers are not asked to observe their students, only to rate them. This measure was developed as a companion measure to the Responsive Self-Concept Test (FitzGibbon, 1970) which is described in more detail in another section.

Though still in the early stages of development, the Parents' Report on Children's Behavior, a subsection of the Parent Kindergarten Evaluation Form (Coller, 1970), contains a cluster of items designed to assess selfconcept via the manifest and/or cloaked retrospective trace reports

approach. Sometime after the onset of educational intervention, parents are asked to rate their children by a variety of dimensions using modified and unmodified adjectives. Parents indicate for each dimension if and in what direction they think their children have changed. In this respect alone, they are forced to employ behavioral traces. They are also asked to express their opinion as to whether they think behavioral changes on each of the dimensions was because of events that happened to the child at school, at home, or just in the course of growing up.[25] Some of the items related to the selfconcept cluster consist of behavior dimensions that may be observed by the parent as the child interacts with adults or peers; other dimensions must be inferred; and still others reflect the parents' attitudes towards their children more than the behavior of their children. This latter set of items was included on the assumption that children will grasp their parents' attitudes towards them and will tend to incorporate such attitudes as part of their own selfconcepts. In a study that employed the Parents' Report on Children's Behavior, Coller found that parents generally perceived the evaluated kindergarten program as a contributing factor to positive change in their children's self-regard.

Neither of the measures described in this section has been validated adequately. The Rating Scale for Measuring a Child's Self-Concept was developed to help validate a different type of instrument, and the Parents' Report of Children's Behavior (PROCB) requires extensive revision and standardization in order to reach its potential. The PROCB, however, is the only measure encountered that employs a respondent (a parent in this case) from outside of the school system to gather information about the child's selfconcept. Data gathered in this manner may prove useful as a means of evaluating educational programs and as a check against the ratings by others. Discrepant scores, which do not indicate a psychometric problem, may reflect needed program changes.

C. Self-Report Procedures

People have a unique talent: they can relate to others their feelings, thoughts, and experiences; they can describe for others their idioconceptual structures. Thus, to learn something about a child's selfconcept, the examiner need not seek out traces of behavior nor wait for behavior to emerge spontaneously, instead, he may ask the child to describe himself or to report on behaviors that especially interest him. This is, of course, a simplistic assessment notion when one deals with the very young child (where direct observation is vital) but it is an extremely useful and economical approach when one attempts to assess the selfconcept of older more responsive children. (In the final section we discuss issues involved in use of self-reports for collecting selfconcept related data.)

Instruments that require the respondents to recount their past behavior or to make judgments concerning their selves or their behaviors generally are referred to as self-report measures. It should surprise no one that self-report procedures represent the most common class of techniques employed in the assessment of the selfconcept. It is possible to distinguish between three types of self-report techniques: manifest and/or cloaked self-reports, reports on symbolically contrived situations, and episodic recall. The first two approaches, essentially identical, are treated separately because (1) test constructors have developed a greater proportion of measures of the reports on symbolically contrived situations than of any other single type of self-report measure, and (2) reports on symbolically contrived situations are easily confused with certain projective techniques. This type of self-report approach is thus highlighted here to make the reader more aware of this classification problem. Episodic recall is seldom employed in a systematic fashion but is probably an everyday technique applied by parents as well as teachers.

In a minor way this approach probably aids the teacher to form basic impressions of the child.

Most self-report measures are of the psychometric variety: personality inventories or checklists, Q-sorts, semantic differentials, and rating and ranking scales of all types have been used. In addition, questionnaires, interviews, and autobiographical techniques may be employed to collect data.

1. Manifest and/or cloaked self-reports refer to a class of instruments that range from self-reports whose testing objectives are not disguised to self-reports whose testing objectives are either intentionally or psychometrically disguised. In general, manifest self-report instruments assess aspects of the self that they appear to assess, while cloaked self-report instruments assess dispositions only indirectly related to the particular stimulus situation to which the child responds. The distinction between manifest and cloaked self-reports become cloudy when respondents can discern only some of the testing objectives. In such instances, the assignment of instruments to either of these subcategories is somewhat arbitrary.

The Brown-IDS Self-Concept Referents Test (Brown, 1966) and the Thomas Self-Concept Values Test (Thomas, 1969) are similar instruments of the manifest self-report variety: each employs essentially the same testing format. The child is photographed, and when he sees the picture, responds to an orally defined bipolar alternate-choice scale (i.e., he answers questions asked by the examiner: "Is Johnny Gallagher happy or sad?"). Four different referents are used: (1) the child as he sees himself, (2) the child as he sees his mother seeing him, (3) as he sees his teacher seeing him, and (4) as he sees other kids seeing him. The authors of these instruments recommend that the younger child (the preschooler and kindergartner) should be tested over two sessions. These two tests differ in the number and type of items in their scoring procedures.

The Brown-IDS Self-Concept Referents Test (BIDSSCRT) provides the user with a self-as-subject score,[26] a self-as-object score, and scores for each of the four referents taken singly. The Thomas Self-Concept Values Test (TSCVT) provides scores for the four referents, a total selfconcept score, and a profile in respect to the value (item) dimension.

Brown (1966) and other white examiners[27] administered the BIDSSCRT to three independent samples of 4-year-olds in New York City. Two of the samples were composed of young black children from low socioeconomic status (SES) families. Sample I, children attended an enriched preschool program conducted by the Institute for Developmental Studies. Sample II children were enrolled in a day care center. Sample III was composed of children from white upper-middle SES families. The results indicated that the two samples of lower SES black Ss did not substantially differ from one another. However, black Ss obtained scores that were significantly lower than those received by white Ss. Brown interpreted his results to mean that the black children tended to perceive themselves in less positive ways than did white children. Black children, in comparison to white children, more readily imagined that significant others (especially their teachers) saw them less positively.[28] Thomas (1969) likewise investigated the SES variable and found the TSCVT able to differentiate between highly privileged and underprivileged groups. In general, members of the highly privileged group perceived themselves more positively than members of the underprivileged group. Thomas also found some low but significant correlational coefficients when various selfconcept scores were compared to demographic variables, such as: number of siblings, amount of father's education, and child's age. The more brothers and sisters the child had, the lower his concept of himself. The higher the educational level of the father, the more positive did the child see his teacher's and peers' perceptions of him (the child) to be. The older child is more likely to see his mother's

perception of him to be more positive.

The recently revised Illinois Index of Self-Derogation (Meyerowitz, 1962) and the Children's Self-Concept Index (Helms, Holthouse, Granger, Cicirelli, and Cooper, 1968)[29] (which was used for the controversial Westinghouse/Ohio University Head Start study) are similar instruments. The latter is a modified version of an early version of the former. Both tests may be administered to small groups (about five children), and both essentially employ the same test format. Children are shown predrawn, paired, human-like stick figures (one holding a balloon, and one holding a flag). The examiner ascribes certain characteristics to the figures; for example, he says, "the balloon-child is learning a lot in school; the flag-child isn't learning very much." For each item, the child is asked to indicate which of the stick-figures is most like him. The overall score focuses upon the tendency towards self-derogation or the selection of socially undesirable responses. These measures appear to measure the self with regard to peer acceptance, home, school, and self-regard. The Meyerowitz-Westinghouse approach, the format of which may be characterized as an orally defined graphic (or picture-type) alternate-choice scale, differs from the Brown-Thomas approach. In the Meyerowitz-Westinghouse approach, the child responds, not directly to verbal statements, but indirectly to the stick figures, which are but representations: signs of the statements.

Meyerowitz (1962) tested the selfconcepts of educable mentally handicapped (EMH) children with Form 1 of the Illinois Index of Self-Derogation (IISD). One hundred and twenty first grade children (of 1807 tested) were designated as EMH. Through randomization, 60 children were assigned to special classes, while the remainder were left in their regular classes. An SES matched cirterion group of normal first graders also was selected. The findings after a year of schooling indicated that (1) EMH children ascribed to themselves

significantly more socially undesirable responses than did normal children, and (2) EMH children assigned to special classes ascribed significantly more derogations to themselves than the EMH children who remained in their regular class. In a follow-up study (Meyerowitz, 1969) Form 2 of the IISD was administered at the beginning of the second school year. No significant difference in the number of self-derogations made was found among the three groups. Form 3 (a further minor revision of the IISD) was administered at the end of the second school year. At this time, EMH children in special classes accepted significantly more self-derogations than did either of the other groups. Meyerowitz claimed that special class placement for the EMH cannot be justified in terms of their mental health. The results of the overall analysis of the Children's Self-Concept Index (Cicirelli, 1969) employed in the Westinghouse-Ohio University Head Start investigations, revealed that Head Start children from either summer or full-year programs did not score significantly higher than control populations at any of the three grade levels studied. In the subgroup analysis Head Start first grade groups in the mainly Negro centers had a higher selfconcept than controls. The reverse was true of grade 2 children. There were no significant differences at grade 3.

The Faces Scale, developed by J. R. Frymier and reported in Beatty (1969), like the Meyerowitz-Westinghouse approach, is an orally defined graphic (picture-type), alternate-choice scale. However, instead of stick figures, the child is presented with identical sets of happy and sad faces. The examiner asks the child to indicate how he feels about a particular situation by placing an X through the face which shows his feelings. The overall selfconcept score obtained for this measure purportedly is designed to assess the child's attitude towards school. To some degree attitudes concerning physical development, home life, new experiences, and social relationships are assessed by

this instrument. Jacobs and Felix (1967) reported results related to a mo[illegible] version of the Faces Scale (as developed by Frymier). The test was administered to samples of second graders who attended either urban or suburban schools. Comparisons of total test scores failed to reveal any significant differences in selfconcept between these groups. The Self-Concept and Motivation Inventory (Farrah, Milchus, and Reitz, 1968) and a measure known as When Do I Smile? developed at the American Institutes for Research and reported by Dysinger (1970) also make use of faces for response purposes. These instruments differ from the Faces Scale, since more than two faces are employed to define points along the scale. The expressions on the faces vary from very happy to very sad. Such scales are referred to as graphic (picture-type), multiple-choice scales. Dysinger administered the When Do I Smile? scale to elementary school children (grades 1-5) in the fall and spring sessions of the school year. The resulting change or difference scores were analyzed by grade and by classroom ratings in respect to judged teacher performance. The relationship between classroom rating and selfconcept score change was not found to be statistically significant for the combined grade levels. Another analysis that failed to reach signficance involved judges who identified students whom they felt made progress in improving their selfconcepts. A similar measure of the nonpicture-type variety of graphic scales called How Much Like Me? being developed at the American Institutes for Research,[30] employs circles instead of faces (the circles vary in size). In addition, this instrument is intended for children of [illegible] reading age. The Self-Concept and Motivation Inventory, discussed above, has been factorially designed and divides selfconcept into scores for role expectation and self-adequacy. Scores for eight factors are obtained. When Do I Smile? is essentially designed to assess changes in the child's feeling towards school. Some questions deal with social activities. An overall score is

obtained for this measure as well as the How Much Like Me? test, which assesses selfconcept in general. Another type of graphic, multiple-choice rating scale is found in a measure called the Where Are You Game (Engel and Raine, 1963). This technique employs a scale in the form of a vertical ladder upon which stick figures (described by the examiner with opposing statements) were drawn above the upper and below the lower rungs. The children were asked to place a mark on the ladder where they think they are in relation to the two stick figures. An overall score that encompasses four or five factor dimensions is calculated for this test which purports to measure global self-concept.

The Parental Approval Index (PAI), developed by staff of the Instructional Objectives Exchange (1970), is an example of a multiple point descriptive rating scale. In this instance the scale runs from "love me" to "hate me." The child is asked to place himself in fictitious situations in which he behaves in certain ways. He is then requested to indicate how his mother would feel about the way he behaved and how she would feel about "you as a person." This index is designed to assess the extent to which a child views himself as unconditionally accepted by his mother. (The PAI may be more reactive than the other measures reviewed in that the mere administration of the instrument would tend to change the childs behavior.)

A revised 48-item version of the Self-Concept Inventory (Sears, 1963) has been found to be suitable for bright third graders. The revised inventory (Sears, undated) measures the child's self-esteem in several areas assumed to be important in children's self-evaluation: physical ability, attractive appearances, convergent and divergent mental abilities, social relations with children of the same sex, social virtues, work habits, happy qualities, and school subjects. The child is asked to rate himself in terms of a 5-point descriptive rating scale ranging from excellent to not

so good. Gordon's How I See Myself scale (Gordon, 1968), intended for readers, is a numerically descriptive multiple-choice rating scale. The instructions, statements, and scales are printed for each respondent to read and respond to himself usually in a group setting. A factor analysis produced the following factor structure: teacher-school, physical appearance, interpersonal adequacy, autonomy, and academic adequacy.

The Self Concept of Ability Scale (SCAS) developed by the staff of the Maryland Center of the Interprofessional Research Commission on Pupil Personnel Services (IRCOPPS) and reported by Dayton (1968) is also intended for readers and also contains numerically descriptive multiple-choice rating scales. A factor analysis produced self-reference measures for: general, arithmetic, english,social studies, science, music, and art.

The Self-Concept as a Learner Scale-Elementary (SCALE) reported in Beatty (1969) (but constructed by J.K. Fisher) and the Self-Concept Instrument: A Learner Scale (Liddle, 1967) (both modifications of a scale developed by Walter Waetjin) are examples of true-false or yes-no type self-report instruments. Children judge whether or not statements are true for them by indicating "yes" or "no." Both are designed to assess the self re learning. SCALE assesses four factors: mostivation, task orientation, problem solving, and class membership. The Piers-Harris Children's Self-Concept Scale (Piers and Harris, 1964) is similar to these two measures. While an overall score is employed, a factor analysis produced the following factor structure: behavior, intellectual and school status, physical appearance, anxiety, popularity, and happiness and satisfaction. Piers (1969) provides the user with instructions to develop cluster scores. The Self Appraisal Inventory Primary Level, developed by the IOX staff--The Instructional Objectives Exchange (1970),

assess four aspects of the selfconcept: general, family, peer, and scholastic. Two other measures developed at IOX, the Class Play (Instructional Objective Exchange, 1970) and Television Actors (Instructional Objectives Exchange, 1970) also employ the yes-no format. Both ask the child to pretend that he may be selected to assume a role (either in a class play or in a television show). In the Class Play instructors request the child to indicate the acting roles (from a selected set) his teacher and members of his family would choose for him to undertake. The total number of "yes" responses to favorable roles is counted. It is assumed that an individual who has a positive selfconcept will perceive that others would likely cast him in roles which project a positive image. The instructions for Television Actors direct the child to indicate which roles he would be willing to assume. The number of roles the child would be willing to play is counted. The assumption for this measure is that the child who possesses a positive selfconcept would be willing to portray a wider variety of roles than a child with a less positive self-concept.

The Index of Adjustment and Values developed by Bills, Vance, and McLean (1951), a group measure, varies from the above instruments by permitting the respondent to answer yes, no, sometimes, or yes, no, don't care. The measure consists of statements which describe traits related to the self and others. Three scores are obtained: a Self Index, an "Others" score, and a self-others agreement (or discrepancy) score. Ketchum and Morse (1965) dropped the lie scale and the "home self" subscale from the Coopersmith Self-Esteem Inventory (Coopersmith, 1959) and found that they were able to administer the shortened version (42 items) to third graders. Dyer (1963) likewise administered the Coopersmith Self-Esteem Inventory (SCEI) to third graders. The CSEI is very much like the yes-no scales just reviewed; in this

instance, however, individual respondents (the measure is group administered) indicated whether a descriptive statement is "Like Me" or "Unlike Me." Besides a total self-esteem score, the CSEI provides the following three subscores: (1) self, (2) social self, and (3) school self.

The Responsive Self-Concept Test (FitzGibbon, 1970) requires the child to determine if the examiner is talking about the respondent (the child), about someone the respondent knows, or about someone the respondent does not know. A photograph of the child is pasted on a card between two other pictures which are defined for the child as "someone he knows" and "someone he doesn't know." Nine psychosocial factor areas are assessed: self-awareness, emotional effect, relationship with family, peer relationship, verbal participation, approach to learning, reaction to success/failure, self-satisfaction, and level of aspiration.

Another instrument, the Global and Specific Self-Concept Scale-Primary (Stillwell, 1965), is based upon the measurement concepts of the semantic differential. The bipolar adjectives selected for inclusion were chosen not only on the basis of high factor loadings for evaluation, potency, and activity, but also on the basis of face validity. The adjectives appeared to have a relationship to the concepts chosen for rating. This particular measure differs from the typical semantic differential, since points along the continuum are narratively described rather than indicated by numerical or other graphic characters. It may be used to assess global selfconcept; i.e., "myself" or specific role selfconcept, including "myself as a student," "myself as a reader," or "myself as my parents see me." An overall score is used, but relational scores may also be obtained.

Normally conceived interview techniques are represented by the Self-Concept Interview developed by FitzGibbon and Nimnicht (undated). The

interview is partly unstructured; that is, the initial part, which requires the child to talk about a picture of a child entering a school building, is unstructured. The structured questions, which follow after rapport is established, are designed to assess the selfconcept of the child re school. Individual questions attempt to tap the child's perception of his cognitive skills and his ego resources; i.e., motivation, interest, and social maturity that are reflected in classroom decorum, promptness, compliant attitude, and interaction with peers. Varying scores, 2 to 0, are assigned on the basis of the quality of response; i.e., from enthusiastic to negative responses.

In a study of kindergarten children, FitzGibbon and Nimnicht compared sex and three levels of school social class in relation to selfconcept measured by the Self-Concept Interview. Interaction effects indicated that there was a significant difference between the selfconcepts of boys and girls in lower and middle class schools, but not in the upper class school. Lower class boys had poorer selfconcepts than lower class girls; the reverse is true of children in middle class schools.

While none of the measures described in this section have been validated sufficiently, there are several instruments which have been or are being administered to large samples under diverse conditions. The following instruments are examples: Brown-IDS Self-Concept Referents Test, Thomas Self-Concept Values Test, Illinois Index of Self-Derogation, Children's Self-Concept Index, and the Piers-Harris Children's Self-Concept Scale. The Self-Concept and Motivation Inventory and the How I See Myself scale have not been sufficiently validated with younger children, but they have been used extensively with older children in fourth grade and higher grades.

2. Reports on symbolically contrived situations refer to a class of instruments, close variants of manifest and/or cloaked self-reports which

employ pictorial or other graphic symbols to depict characteristics and/or behavior dispositions the child might be expected to display in real life situations. To differentiate reports on symbolically contrived situations from projective procedures, it is essential for the depicted characteristics and behavior disposition either to be described in detail by the examiner or to be portrayed unambiguously. (If the latter approach is used, the test constructor should collect data concerning the face validity of the instrument.) Conversely, if the situations are vague in theme and incomplete in content (conditions suitable for assessing the nonphenomenal self) they should be treated as projective measures (Symonds, 1946).

In the Preschool Self-Concept Picture Test (Woolner, 1966), children are required to select from two pictures the drawing (of the child) which is "like themselves" and "the one they would like to be." Characteristics (clean-dirty) and behavioral dispositions (sharing-not sharing) are displayed but not described by the examiner. In a face validity study the children's descriptions of the plates agreed with the test designer's descriptions. The measure provides several scores for self and ideal-self that are then compared with each other to provide a measure of the degree of congruence; the dissatisfaction with self score. As reported in Boger and Knight (1969), the Preschool Self-Concept Picture Test was administered to a group of emotionally healthy preschool children and a group of emotionally disturbed preschoolers. Results indicated that these two groups of children viewed themselves differently: healthy children perceived themselves to possess more positive characteristics than disturbed children. Congruence between self and ideal selfconcept was 80% to 100% in the emotionally healthy group but only between 00% to 20% in the disturbed group.

The Learner Self-Concept Test, developed by the [illegible] Department, Office of Research and Evaluation and described by DiLorenzo (1968), is composed of sets of one or two drawings, each of which represents a particular classroom situation. The situations were designed to reflect, in part, the kinds of behavior that prekindergarten children with positive selfconcepts might see themselves doing. For example, the child perceives that he is able to perform large motor activities well. The classroom situations depicted, including the thoughts and/or behavior of at least two of the children in the drawings, are described by the examiner. The respondent is asked to select either the positive or the negative character depicted in the drawing who is most like him. The self re the learning situation; that is, relationships with peers, teachers, and classroom materials are assessed by this measure. DiLorenzo summarized data collected from experimental and control children in nine preschool classes over a 3-year period. He reported that neither traditional nor cognitive-oriented programs effectively altered selfconcept in the total population. The programs were not successful with any subgroup by race or sex. In general, nondisadvantaged children had higher selfconcept scores than did disadvantaged children. White disadvantaged children also had more positive selfconcepts than black disadvantaged children.

The examiner also describes the characteristics and/or behaviors of children displayed in pairs of drawings in the Self-Concept Instrument (Moellenberg, 1967). Each pair of pictures represents opposite extremes of a particular aspect of selfconcept. Children are directed to mark the picture from each set which "is most like them." On a second administration the children mark the picture which "is the best way to be." Moellenberg reported (1) sex

differences, and (2) that children who attend schools in middle class neighborhoods exhibit more desirable ideal selfconcepts than children who attend schools in lower class neighborhoods.

The Faces (Scott and Jeffress, 1969), which should not be confused with Faces Scale, is designed to assess the attitudes of children relevant to the school situation and focuses upon four major areas: child-home, child-peer group, child-authority, and child-school. Stick figures are employed to represent people in various transactional situations and are depicted without expression. The face of one figure is blank. The depicted situations are briefly described to the child, who must choose from among five stick-on faces that range from "very happy" to "very sad." The child places the chosen stick-on face upon the one blank face in the depicted situations.

The Pictorial Self-Concept Scale (Bolea, Felker, and Barnes, 1970) first requires the child to decide whether the central figure (always a child with a star on his shirt) in a set of cartoons is like him, not like him, or sometimes like him, and then he places the cartoon in one of three indicated piles. Judges were employed (1) to determine if each of Jersild's (1952) categories (what children said they liked and disliked about themselves) was represented by the cartoons, and (2) to rank the cartoons according to which items would be most important to a child's selfconcept on a positive to negative continuum. Scoring was based on the placement of the cartoon and the weighted value of the cartoon. Bolea, et al. summarized several studies that employed the Pictorial Self-Concept Scale (PSC). Ninety-one percent of a sample of black first graders had both a negative selfconcept and a distorted race image (Storm, 1968). A high selfconcept group was less restricted in their drawing when compared to a low selfconcept group (Sun, 1969). The

hypothesis that students who have perceptual impairment (as measured by the Frostig Test of Visual Perception) will also have negative selfconcepts was supported (Desrosiers, 1968). Vols.(1968) found that increases in selfconcept scores were associated with increased differentiation in the drawings of self-portraits by children.

The Children's Projective Pictures of Self-Concept (CPPSC),[31] developed by McNamara, Porterfield, Miller and Arnold (1968), directs children to choose, from each situation presented, the pictured child who is doing what they would do. An overall score is produced that may be used to assess general selfconcept. Judges were employed to weight the choices in terms of adequacy of selfconcept. This test, with the exception of the first plate, is similar to the Pictorial Self-Concept Scale. The depicted situations are not described by the examiner, and test-age children have not been employed to determine if the pictures truly depict what the test constructors intend the children to perceive. However, in both tests artists received specific instructions on the concrete situations the drawings should depict, so it is assumed that ambiguity was not intended and that these tests should be classified as self-report techniques rather than as projective measures. McNamara, et al. reported that significant gains in selfconcept scores were made in a pre- and posttest evaluation of children enrolled in a Head Start program. In a similar study that involved the CPPSC, Porterfield, Ikller, and Arnold (1969) reported that significant gains in selfconcept scores were again found.

Again it must be reported that no instruments in this section have been validated sufficiently. The Pictorial Self-Concept Scale and the Preschool Self-Concept Picture Test appear to have been used more frequently than the others. In general, measures of the reports on symbolically contrived situations variety seem to be especially useful to assess the selfconcept of the younger child, and should be further investigated.

3. Episodic recall refers to techniques that require the child to recount (with emphasis on his behavior] some of the events that transpired and involved him either during that day or at an earlier time. Sechrest (1968) indicated that this technique is not frequently used in personality assessment. And, in this respect, it must be reported that there does not seem to be any currently available standardized technique designed to elicit episodic recall data from children enrolled in early childhood educational programs. This, however, does not mean that the technique is not often used. To the contrary, and for obvious reasons, teachers and especially parents rely heavily upon this technique. "What happened?" is a typical question employed to elicit episodic recall data.

As a technique for the assessment of selfconcept, episodic recall now seems to be used either not at all or else in an unsystematic fashion. In part this is due to the requirement that interview procedures be employed, at least for the very young. The written autobiographical type may prove useful (possibly as a nonreactive measure) in the assessment of older children and should receive more attention.

D. Projective Techniques

Lindzey (1961) differentiated between two important meanings of projection: classic and generalized. Classic projection, typically assumed to be Freud's meaning of projection, refers to the process of ascribing one's own unacceptable impulses or qualities to other individuals or objects in the outer world. It is generally believed that this is an unconscious and pathological process. On the other hand, generalized projection, refers to normal process in which the perceptions and interpretations of the outer world are influenced by the individual's inner cognitive emotional states: the nonphenomenal self. It is this second meaning of projection that Lindzey argued "would embrace virtually all of the tests that are commonly considered to be projective devices" (p. 38). It's not irrelevant to ask: "What are the characteristics of tests that are to be classified as projective techniques?" At the present time there is no satisfactory answer to this question. Campbell (1957), for one, feels that the rubric projective, at one time quite meaningful, has been stretched to include such a heterogeneous variety of measures that its denotational value has become attenuated.[32] Basically, projective techniques are assumed to be especially sensitive to covert or unconscious aspects of behavior and thus are deemed useful for assessing the nonphenomenal aspects of selfconcept. There are some theorists who believe that one should be able to predict behavior more accurately from a knowledge of the child's unconscious selfconcept than one can from a knowledge of his conscious selfconcept (Wylie, 1961). (Self-report measures assess the phenomenal or conscious aspects of selfconcept.) Perhaps Lindzey's characterization of projective techniques comes closest to an acceptable answer:

> A projective technique is an instrument that is considered especially sensitive to covert or unconscious aspects of behavior, it permits or encourages a wide variety of subject responses, is highly multidimensional, and it makes unusually rich or profuse response data with a minimum of subject aware-

> ness concerning the purpose of the test. Further it is very often true that the stimulus material presented by the projective test is ambiguous, the test evokes fantasy responses, and there are no correct or incorrect responses to the test (p. 45).

Examination of the six categories of projective procedures described below will reveal that this characterization does not hold for all measures. The six different projective techniques are called (1) "cued associations," (2) "cued constructions," (3) "minimally-induced constructions," (4) "completions," (5) "view of the stimulus through choice and/or ordering," and (6) "self-expression."[33] When we ask the child to respond to a stimulus situation with the first word, image, or percept that occurs to him, the child is said to be "associating." When the child creates a product (not necessarily a material product), he is "constructing." There are two major types of construction techniques: those in which the stimulus situations are thought to cue a specific content-range of responses, and those in which the stimulus situations limit only the mode of response. During the construction process the examiner may be more concerned with the manner or style by which the product is created; in such cases, the child is said to be engaged in "self-expression." (Self-expression measures normally are variants of direct observation procedures.) When the child is presented with some type of incomplete product and asked to complete it, the child responds to a completions-type measure. Finally, when the child, in response to a specific set of instructions, orders or chooses from among a set of ambiguous stimuli, the child responds to a type of assessment approach called "view of the stimulus through choice and/or ordering."

1. Cued associations represent techniques that instruct the child to respond to complex stimulus situations with the first word, image, or percept that occurs to him (Lindzey, 1961). The stimuli may be verbal, as in the case

of word association tests, or symbolic as in the case of inkblot tests. Halpern (1960) discussed how the Rorschach Test may be used to assess the selfconcept of the young child. The Rorschach consists of a set of inkblots to which the child is asked to associate--to respond immediately with the first ideas that come to him. The results of testing with the Rorschach usually provides one with qualitative informationwhich may be related more with the adjustment of the child (an aspect of self-as-subject) rather than with the descriptive details of his selfconcept. However, in Linton and Graham's (1959) study of older children it was assumed that passivity or assertiveness of Rorschach M reflected Ss unconscious self-image. Also high Hd on the Rorschach Test was alleged to indicate selfcriticalness and preoccupation with self and body. Wylie (1961) discussed the use of the Rorschach with older children and adults. Note that administration techniques used in the assessment of children differ slightly from those for adults. And, since the Rorschach requires the services of experts (both for administration and interpretation), this is an unlikely test for educational assessment.

2. Cued constructions refer to those instruments that required the child to create or construct a product in response to complex stimulus situations. The stimulus situations are thought to cue responses of a specifiable content area. The Blacky Pictures (Blum, 1950), for example, is composed of a set of animal pictures, each assumed to be related to a specific area of psychosexual development: oral eroticism, oral sadism, oedipal intensity, etc. The focus of cued constructions instruments is on the end-product itself and not on the behavior of the child as he constructs the product. Typical responses, such as storytelling, drawing, or rearranging stimuli, are considered to be more complex than those called for by the association-type measures (Lindzey, 1961).

Bellak and Adelman (1960) assumed that the child's "self-image" is revealed in the stories children tell when the Children's Apperception Test (Bellak and Bellak, 1950) is administered. The CAT, as this instrument is more commonly known, consists of a set of animal pictures that display a variety of characteristics and behaviors. Children are asked to tell a story about the pictures--to describe what the animals are doing. The Make-A-Picture Story Test (Schneidman, 1949) may also be employed to assess self-concept. The MAPS test, as this test is called, is a variation of the thematic apperception type tests. The backgrounds and figures of the MAPS are separated, and the child is faced with the task of selecting one or more cutout human-like figures, populating the background picture, and then telling a story about the stimulus situation he has helped to create (Schneidman, 1960). The unstructured part of the Self-Concept Interview, developed by FitzGibbon, and Nimnicht (undated) and described in the self-report section, may also be assigned to this category. ["Negative self-concepts," inferred from stories told in response to the set of Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) pictures, which were originally developed by Morgan and Murray (1935), have been studied in adolescents (Mussen and Jones, 1957) and college students (Mussen and Porter, 1959). Selfconcept was inferred on the basis of descriptions of the TAT hero. In the Mussen and Jones study, negative terms such as imbecile, weakling, or fanatic were scored. Each story in the Mussen and Porter study (they used only five TAT pictures and added three of their own) was assigned one point toward negativity-of-selfconcept score if the TAT hero was described either as a failure, disgusted, ashamed, angry with himself, or if other unflattering terms were employed.] (See Wylie (1961) for additional information concerning the TAT and selfconcept.)

Another type of measure, the Measurement of Self-Concept in Kindergarten Children (Levin and Lafferty, 1967) requires children to draw pictures. Some

of the pictures are drawn after the children have listened to a story, looked at a cartoon, or seen a movie; other drawings are drawn without these conditions present.

With the single exception of the Measurement of Self-Concept in Kindergarten Children, these measures are not often employed to assess selfconcept. They require considerable time for administration and skilled personnel for interpretation.

3. Minimally-induced constructions and cued constructions both require the child to construct a response. However, they differ in the type of eliciting stimulus (i.e., the stimulus situation employed to induce the response). Minimally-induced constructions use only simple instruction and occasional malleable materials to narrow the content-range of the response. The examples that follow represent a few of the instructions that might be possible for techniques in this category: "draw a person," "tell a story about school," "make your own face out of paper mâche." Drawing instructions are the most popular form of this projective procedure. For discussions of human figure drawings see Machover (1960) and Koppitz (1968).

The scoring system for the Make-A-Boy(Girl) portion of the Riley Preschool Developmental Screening Inventory (Riley, 1969), a variation of the Goodenough-Harris Drawing Test, (Harris, 1963) and the Draw-A-Person Test (Machover, 1948) represents but one way in which the selfconcept of children may be assessed through the analysis of drawings they make of persons. Riley's system employs both a quantitative (inclusion of parts of the body) and a qualitative analysis. Harris (1963) admits that the "case for unconscious representation of the 'self' in human figure drawing has not been firmly established" (p. 46). However, he does argue that child self-portraits, when such are explicitly requested (instead of requesting a person, boy, girl, etc.),

do portray the drawer's appearance; his self-image. In a pre- and posttest design the Goodenough-Harris Draw-A-Man Test was administered to experimental and control Head Start children. Crovetto, Fischer, and Boudreaux (1967) reported that an experimental group showed gains on this measure but a control group did not. In a follow-up study Crovetto, Fischer, and Boudreaux (1968) reported that posttest comparisons between the experimental class and the control class revealed a significant difference on the Draw-A-Man Test. Studies that utilize the Goodenough-Harris Drawing Test to detect maladjustment in kindergarten children and to measure self-concept have been reported by Vane and Eiser (1962) and Vane and Kessler (1964). Signs (such as no body, arms, or mouth) and grotesque drawings were employed as indicators of maladjustment in children at the third grade level.

Hulse (1951) employed the Family Drawing Test to assess the selfconcept of children and their perception of their role in the family. The size and placement of the self figure, as well as other indicators, are used in the assessment.

The HTP-Cincinnati Self-Concept Index reported in Jacobs and Felix (1967) represents another procedure to arrive at a measure of the child's selfconcept through the analysis of drawings. In this instance the House-Tree-Person Test (HTP) is employed as a means to elicit the drawings. The Cincinnati scoring system is composed of eight factors which the examiner rates for presence on a 3-point scale. In a study that involved urban and suburban children by grades, Jacobs and Felix reported a grade difference with children in higher grades obtaining the higher scores. No within-grade effect because of the location of school was observed, however. (Readers will find additional information related to the HTP test in Hammer (1960).)

The drawing measures discussed in this section appear to be popular ways of assessing selfconcept. Certainly the data are easily obtained. Caution should be exercised, however, since these measures still have not been validated sufficiently. Like most of the previously discussed projective measures, these measures also provide mainly evaluative rather than descriptive data.

4. Completions. Measures that may be categorized as completions include those in which the child is presented with an incomplete product that he is required to complete. Within the limits of the situation, the child may complete the stimulus materials in any manner he wishes. Such tests differ from cued associations since completions require constructed responses that are more complex. Sentence completion techniques, which are among the most well known tests in this category, usually require written responses and therefore cannot be administered easily to the young child. Drawing completion techniques are more effectively administered to the young child.

The Symbol Elaboration Test reported by Krout (1950) is a drawing completion technique which requires the child to finish stimulus patterns that are assumed to represent a variety of attitudes and relationships among which is the factor of selfconcept.

In the Haworth and Woltman (1959) Rock-A-Bye, Baby group projective test a 35-minute, 16 mm. sound projective puppet film is shown to children who are first asked to make up their own ending to the completed story. Upon termination of the remainder of the film the children are asked a number of inquiry questions. The authors indicate that two aspects of the protocols gives insight into the child's perception of himself: the character he chooses to be on question no. 3; viz, "which one of the people in the show would you most like to be?" "Why?" and, expressions of sympathy for, or aggression against, the main child character. Completions, however, seldom have been used in the educational assessment of selfconcept.

5. View of the stimulus through choice and/or ordering. Because of their formats and the types of response required of the child, the view of the stimulus through choice and/or ordering techniques come closest to the self-report or psychometric methods described earlier. There are at least two criteria that may be employed, either separately or conjunctively, to distinguish between self-report methods and projective techniques of the choice or ordering variety. For example, the stimulus situation may be ambiguous. More frequently, the elicited response represents a highly personal inferential value judgment and thus defies absolute external validification; e.g., choosing the "good" child in a picture. In essence, the child is typically asked to choose from a limited number of alternatives the item(s) or arrangement that fits some specified criterion such as correctness, goodness, relevance, attractiveness, or likeability (Lindzey, 1961).

The Creelman Self-Conceptions Test (Creelman, 1954) is a projective technique which requires a choice response from the child. Presented with a set of plates containing relatively ambiguous drawings that depict a variety of interpersonal situations, children are asked to choose from each plate the picture they "like best" and the one that "they do not like." Then, from the same set of plates, the children are asked to select the picture they think is "good" and the one that is "bad." Finally, children are requested to indicate which of the pictures is "most like you" and which is "most different from you." The format for this instrument may be described as a picture-type multiple-choice test that requires multiple responses. From an analysis of "choice coincidence," it is possible to derive combination scores that indicate self-acceptance, self-rejection, self-evaluation, and the acceptance and rejection of moral or social standards perceived by the child. Creelman administered her test to children of three different age levels. Age trends and sex differences were found. In general, lower self-acceptance and self-

evaluations were found at the younger ages. Boys had higher selfconcepts than girls.

Form C of the Criticalness of Self and Other Persons Test, reported by Cattell and Warburton (1967), employs a yes-no format in response to questions asked about a picture of an unknown child. The test assesses (1) awareness of characteristics, (2) degree of criticalness, and (3) degree of appreciation of self and others.

The Animal Picture Q-Sort, developed by J.E. Riley and reported in Beatty (1969), is an example of a projective technique which requires an ordering response from the child. The Q-Sort was designed to measure the sense of adequacy in children's sex roles. The child is required to sort animal pictures into a forced normal distribution that ranges from "like me" to "unlike me." The scoring system is quite complex and requires a good deal of statistical knowledge. The Self-Acceptance Test reported by Cattell and Warburton (1967) requires the child to sort into two piles pictures of human beings and animals either "like himself" or "not like himself." It is theorized that narcissistic children would choose more pictures like themselves.

The Children's Self-Social Constructs Tests (Long, Henderson, and Zeller, 1967) is a projective technique which requires both choice and ordering responses on the part of the child. Children are presented with a booklet that contains a series of symbolic arrays in which circles and other figures represent the self and/or other persons of importance. The child is required to arrange these symbols by selecting a circle to represent the self or some other person from among those presented, by drawing a circle to stand for himself or another, or by pasting a gummed circle that represents the self onto the page with other symbols. Preschool and primary forms measure self-esteem, social interest, identification, minority identification, realism to size, and

preference for others. In addition, the primary form measures complexity. These tasks have low visibility for the children, and it is assumed that the symbolic arrangements represent social relations in the child's life space. Further, it is assumed that the particular arrangements contain easily translated common meanings. The test is objectively scored and is based upon the relationship of the symbols to one another. Research that involves self-social symbol tasks is quite extensive; for example, see Long, Henderson, and Zeller (1967); McCandless (1968); Richards (1970); Van Arsdall, Roghman, and Nader (1970); and Velelli (1970).

The choice and/or ordering types of projective techniques also represent a popular form of selfconcept assessment. Both the Creelman Self-Conception Test and the Children's Self-Social Constructs Tests represent relatively unique testing approaches that deserve to be investigated more thoroughly.

6. Self-expression. Measures that may be classified as self-expression techniques include those which require the child to combine or incorporate stimuli into some kind of novel production. In this instance the emphasis is upon the manner or style by which the product is created rather than upon the end-product itself (Lindzey, 1961). Providing that massive modification of the natural situation occurs, any of the direct observational procedures may be employed to obtain the basic data. Doll play and play techniques of all varieties are included in this category as well as techniques which employ role play reflected in the psychodrama techniques. Although these techniques are essentially concerned with ego functioning, none could be located that dealt specifically with selfconcept.

E. Combinational Procedures

It is legitimate to ask: can any one type of assessment procedure provide a valid picture of the particular aspect of selfconcept under study? Indeed, some psychologists have argued that it is imperative for several procedures to be employed. Fiske (1963), for one, argues that only when the investigator "can demonstrate comparable findings from different ways of measuring his variable can he begin to hope that he is getting at the core of his concept and is not misinterpreting systematic method variance as trait variance" (p. 464). Citing the peculiar weaknesses of different types of measures, Silver (1965) recommended that a Q-Sort, a sentence-completion blank, and an interview should all be employed in selfconcept assessment. Combs and Soper (1963) argued that the individual's perceptive field, his inner world, is composed of forces of which he is aware and those of which he is unaware, and the use of only one technique cannot assess the full range of his self. Combs and Soper employed the observer as instrument technique. And, Coopersmith (1967) suggested that the problems of defensiveness and response set in self-report measures can be controlled for by using a combination of subjective and behavioral measures.

1. Observer as instrument. Typically, the behavior of individuals is observed from the point of view of the outsider; that is, the causes of behavior are sought in the stimuli or forces exerted upon the individual. In contrast to this external view, it is possible to seek the causes of the child's personal experience: the internal frame of reference. The investigation of the child's inner life usually must be approached by an indirect process of inference; that is, from careful observation of behavior (that occurs under varying conditions), it should be possible to infer the nature of the child's perceptual field, which produced the behavior in the first place (Combs and Soper, 1963). The observer as instrument technique, a special form of the

inferential technique, refers to measurement approaches which require the observer to infer behavior from a repeated process of observation--inference--prediction--observation--inference, etc. Data are collected from a variety of measurement approaches. Through such a process, it is assumed that observers will come closer to accurate understanding of the child's perceptual field; therefore, the observers are regarded as assessment instruments.

The Perception Score Sheet (Combs and Soper, 1963), a rating scale, is divided into 10 subcategories: self generally, self as instrument, self with other children, self with adults, self with teachers, self and the school curriculum, perceptions of children, perceptions of adults, perceptions of teachers, and perceptions of school. The child's selfconcept is inferred through the use of unobtrusive direct observations, interviews, and projective tests. The direct observations consist of three half-hour periods in which each child is observed while engaged in his normal class activities. During the half-hour interview the observer seeks to engage the child in conversation designed to get the feel of the child and to understand the nature of the ways in which the child sees himself and the world in which he operates. Inferences are also made for each child on the basis of data obtained from three kinds of projective test sessions: free play, a situations test, and a picture-story test. Each time data are obtained the observer rates the child's selfconcept on the Perception Score Sheet. These ratings are modified as additional data are obtained. A factor analysis produced the following six factors: general adequacy, acceptable to teacher, adequate to the curriculum, strong enough, important to adults, and important to teachers. In a study that employed the Perception Score Sheet, Combs and Soper had trained observers rate the students and found that children appeared to experience a decrease in adequacy as they moved from kindergarten to first grade.

As a general procedure, observer as instrument should command greater attention. It appears to be a useful (though not a fully validated) method by which massive amounts of data may come under control of the observer-rater. And the large base is in itself psychometrically correct. Earlier, it was suggested that the use of this technique should be extended to other types of measures. There are drawbacks to this procedure, however. The time needed to collect the basic data and the training required to produce a skilled observer are costs ill-afforded in the average educational assessment program. More research is needed to see if these problems can be overcome.

2. Subjective-behavioral comparisons refer to procedures which compare the child's actual behavior with his subjective impressions of that behavior. Wylie (1961)referred to such techniques as measures of "insight" or (as previously described) self-awareness. However, they need not be used strictly as insight measures as is demonstrated by Coopersmith (1967). Typically, self-report measures are employed to assess the child's subjective impression while direct observation and/or behavioral trace procedures are used to assess actual behavior. Sometimes the observer is asked to predict what the child will describe as his usual behavior. In his studies with older children, Coopersmith employed the Coopersmith Self-Esteem Inventory (CSEI) as the self-report measure and the Behavior Rating Form (BRF) as a measure of actual behavior. (As employed, the BRF appears to be a behavioral trace procedure.) Coopersmith compared the results of these two measures in relation to the level of self-evaluation and the extent to which subjective and behavioral evaluations were in agreement. Subjects were then assigned to one of five categories. This approach has been effective in a number of research studies concerned with investigating the antecedents of the evaluative aspects of self-esteem and should be further investigated with younger children.

Obviously we've only touched upon the many possible ways in which the four major procedures may be combined. Earlier, for example, we suggested a weighted score from use of direct observation procedures and behavioral traces. Fiske's admonitions to the evaluator-educator are appropriate here: "He (the investigator) should avoid the economical but dangerous practice of restricting himself to a single instrument, but rather should employ a minimum of two procedures as dissimilar in method as possible" (1963, p. 464). (Similar advice is offered later when a proposed validation model is offered.)

In the immediately preceding sections more than 50 different assessment techniques have been categorized, described and discussed. All techniques purportedly are designed to evaluate, in some unique way, the selfconcept of young children. There can be no argument that the 50-odd instruments differ, for among the measures reviewed are checklists, questionnaires, interview schedules, multiple-choice tests, Q-sorts, semantic differentials, and a variety of rating scales. Children, as subjects for these measures, are directed to choose among alternatives, to order stimuli according to criteria, to complete incomplete drawings, to create stories, to draw pictures of persons, and to otherwise manipulate stimuli.

In addition to these differences, there are tests whose construction features permit them to be administered by the examiner to an individual child. (Ordinarily such tests are essential for the very young.) Other types of tests can be administered by examiners to small groups of children. Still others, typically given to children who can read, are self-administered. (Individual testing is usually the most expensive form of assessment. Self-administered tests are normally more economical.) In response to economical

factors some test constructors have employed multiple formats (i.e., examiner and self-administered forms) in their measurement efforts. By use of this construction feature, they are able to more easily and economically collect data at different age levels. Multiple forms that use identical techniques have been constructed for some of the instruments that employ drawing of the human figure. Normally, only the characteristics which indicate sex and/or racial or ethnic affiliations are modified.

Most measures are multi-item tests, but several tests that consisted of only a single item were also reviewed. The results of administering some instruments are often summarized in a single score. Other instruments produce multiple scores. And, while most instruments can be administered in less than an hour (often in less than a half hour), there are measures that take more than an hour to administer. Indeed, there are measures that have to be readministered on subsequent days.

Aside from these very obvious format differences, selfconcept instruments differ in a more important way: their testing goals or testing objectives vary. This feature, of course, was to be expected from the conceptualization of selfconcept as a multidimensional construct. Some of the described measures attempt to determine whether or not the child's selfconcept has been formed. Provided the child has a discernible selfconcept, there are certain measures that tend to focus upon the adaptive value of that selfconcept or the adjustment level of the child. (Such instruments seem to address themselves more to the self-as-subject aspect than to the self-as-object aspect of self.)[34] Some instruments survey the child's perception of himself. Still other measures assess generally the child's self-evaluative or self-regarding tendencies, as this term is broadly defined.

There are measures which are concerned primarily with the phenomenal aspect of self while others may focus only upon the nonphenomenal aspects. Finally, there are those instruments that seek to measure the child's self-concept under varying sets of circumstances, with varying sets of persons, and/or in varying environments. And, all these measures not only differ in the content areas they assess but also vary widely in breadth of coverage. Under such circumstances it is doubtful whether the scores from such a host of varied measures will mean the same things.

III. SELFCONCEPT: OBSERVATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

It is not possible to explore deeply a subject area nor to review as many instruments as described herein without also reaching some personal conclusions in respect to the materials one has dealt with for such a long period. This part of the paper contains the personal observations of the author. Also provided are a number of suggestions regarding the future direction the author sees for the study of selfconcept. The discussions are short, perhaps too brief, in respect to the importance of the issues, but this paper already far exceeds its intended size.

The three sections which follow include discussions on definitions, validity, and criterion-referenced measurement.

Defining selfconcept

It should be apparent from the foregoing that social scientists--always a divergent group--thus far have not been overly successful in producing a definition for selfconcept that is acceptable by all concerned. And, frankly, it would appear that any such attempt must result in a frustratingly sterile compromise. One such example is readily at hand. The reader may recall that

selfconcept was earlier conceived of by this author as "a multidimensional construct which covers and includes the total range of one's perceptions and evaluations of himself." Expressed here was the notion that selfconcept was not to be thought of as a unitary construct, even though little else was clarified by this "nominal" definition. As a matter of fact, in respect to the diagram presented earlier in Figure 1, the above conceptualization seems to be rather simplistic. In retrospect, while this definition was initially designed to avoid arousing the passions of any group of theorists it probably fails to please even a single one.

Similar difficulties occur when attempting to define selfconcept operationally. In an operational definition the operations one performs to measure the construct become the definition of the construct (Bloom, Hastings, Madaus, 1971). The testing objectives of the 50-odd instruments reviewed in this paper are so divergent that selfconcept must,in general, be defined operationally as that construct or set thereof assessed by the set of so-called self-concept instruments.[35] (The similarity of this definition to the operational definition of intelligence should not be overlooked.) It would seem that theorists would have more success attempting to define operationally the constructs measured by the subconstructs of selfconcept.

Perhaps a different approach to the problem would prove more fruitful. It is possible and for some purposes desirable to think of selfconcept not so much as a unitary trait or organized group of characteristics, but rather, as a technical term that may be employed to designate a given field of study. Selfconcept can thus be treated as a term used as a literary convenience to refer to all, only some, or even one of the many constructs theorists now regard as either being constructually related to selfconcept or what to them

is the true meaning of selfconcept. Using this approach selfconcept may be treated as a generic term given to that set of self-referent-type constructions that presumably together form a unique collection of complexly and dynamically organized fictions.[36] The individual may or may not be aware of such fictions as that which he holds true about himself in respect to given frames of reference but each fiction has a corresponding value. It is assumed that the individual's selfconcept or aspect thereof somehow affects his behavior. The social scientist, using this approach, can avoid the thankless task of redefining a term that has by now lost its power as a clarifying construct. The task for selfconcept theorists would now clearly be to define more precisely the subconstructs of selfconcept. Researchers have the task of determining how the components of selfconcept are related, if at all.

Convergent and Discriminant Validity

Many of the more important methodological issues pertinent to selfconcept assessment have been discussed ably by Wylie (1961, 1968) and by Crowne and Stephens (1961) and need not be re-examined here. Instead, the concern of this section will be with a measurement problem only touched upon by the above mentioned authors; namely, the study of convergent and discriminant validity in respect to selfconcept.

As in the case of selfconcept, validity has been conceived of as a generic term given to a set of generally related ideas, concepts, and procedures. Convergent and discriminant validation, terms employed by Campbell and Fiske (1959), represent only some of the concepts related to validity and refer specifically to a set of proposed operations important to the study of construct validity. (The primary purpose for examining construct validity is to more effectively interpret scores with respect to the underlying construct or

trait purported to be measured by any given instrument.) Campbell and Fiske argued that "in order to estimate the relative contribution of trait and method variance, more than one trait as well as more than one method must be employed in the validation process" (p. 82). The matrix of inter-correlations which results when each of several traits is measured by each of several methods has been called by them the multitrait-multimethod matrix.) Campbell and Fiske reasoned that "measures of the same trait should correlate higher with each other than they do with measures of different traits involving separate methods" (p. 105). In other words, sometimes high correlations, particularly among measures that are designed to assess the same construct, are required as evidence of construct validity. But when the constructs measured by independent methods are assumed to be different, then low correlations are demanded. Convergent validation procedures are employed to study the relationship between supposedly related constructs while discriminant validation procedures are used in the study of measures composed of traits believed to be unrelated.

The following question may now be asked: Is it valid to expect convergent validity to be assessed appropriately by comparing any combination of the set of selfconcept instruments reviewed herein? If only on the basis of the model displayed in Figure 1, the answer must be a resounding "no!" The several cells of the component matrix are conceived of as referring to distinct and operationally unrelated measures. It would be predicted then that low and nonsignificant coefficients would tend to occur from attempts to correlate different types of measures from different cells. If anything, such combinations would tell more about the discriminant validation process. In general,

convergent validity can be studied only from an analysis of different types of measures within any given cell of the component matrix.[37] The foregoing model has been proposed here in response to a survey that indicated that some test constructors had indeed attempted to validate their instruments by comparing them with measures in different cells. (The data from such endeavors are not reviewed here, as abridged versions of tests were employed, and this could tend to produce misleading results.)

However, it would be appropriate to examine some of the data in respect to the convergent validation processes as it is related to method variance. Earlier it was reported that significant but low correlations were obtained when independent self-report measures were compared, in one case to a direct observational procedure (DiLorenzo, 1969), and in another instance to a behavioral trace procedure (FitzGibbon, 1970). The effects of varying methods appear striking when it is realized that the compared instruments contained essentially the same item content. Similar results were obtained by Courson (1968), who found low coefficients when a direct observational procedure was compared with an observer-as-instrument procedure. Likewise, Combs, Soper and Courson (1963) found a lack of significant relationships when a self-report measure was related to an observer-as-instrument measure.

Combs (1962) indicated that he did not believe that self-report measures are selfconcept measures. Combs suggested that the self-report procedure is greatly affected by factors that include the individual's general awareness, availability of adequate symbols for expression, social expectancy, willingness of the individual to cooperate, and the individual's feeling of personal adequacy. Fiske (1963) took a more moderate approach and assumed that "a

subject's description of himself will understandably depart from his description as provided by other people" (p. 463). Fiske also indicated that persons in different relationships to the individual may see him differently.

In general, little research has been done in the area of convergent and discriminant validity. And, what small amount that has been done shows a rather large effect of method variance. While more research is needed in this direction, the employment of several different measures to assess self-concept does appear to be desirable.

Norm-referenced and Criterion-referenced Measurement.

In one way or another most authors of these selfconcept instruments surveyed for this review showed evidence of being concerned with variability--a psychometric construct related to classical test theory.[38] Experience thus dictates that a large proportion of the reviewed instruments, especially those that have commercial potential, will ultimately be constructed by the use of procedures commonly associated with norm-referenced measurement--itself based upon classical test theory.[39] Some of the selfconcept tests that were examined herein and that have already made use of norm-referenced constructs are: Children's Self-Concept Index (Helms, et al.,1968); Children's Self-Social Constructs Tests (Long, et al, 1967); Pictorial Self-Concept Scale (Bolea, et al, 1970); Learner Self-Concept Test (DiLorenzo, 1969); Piers-Harris Children's Self Concept Scale (Piers and Harris, 1964); Preschool Self-Concept Picture Test (Woolner, 1966); Self-Concept and Motivation Inventory (Farrah, et al, 1967); The Thomas Self-Concept Values Test (Thomas, 1969); and When Do I Smile (Dysinger, 1970). Along with the foregoing, such instruments as the Rorschach and others like it have also made some use of norm-referenced procedures.

Briefly, the meaningfulness of the individual score on a norm-referenced test emerges only from a comparison of that score with those obtained previously from some normative group (Popham and Husek, 1969). Designed to provide information with respect to individual differences, the major function of norm-referenced measures is making decisions about individuals. While Stake (1967) agrees that discriminability among students is important for instruction and guidance, he also believed that "...for development and selection of curricula, tests are needed that discriminate among curricula" (p. 6). The reference here is to criterion-referenced instruments; measures that are deliberately constructed to provide measurements that are able to be directly interpreted in terms of specific performance standards. Thus, criterion-referenced measures are used primarily to make instructional decisions.[40]

Since it is unlikely that norm-referenced tests can penetrate to the central core of issues pertinent to a curriculum under study, one must regrettably conclude that the bulk of currently available selfconcept tests are not likely to be of significant value to the educator concerned with the development or modification of specific educational programs for young children. It is therefore recommended that criterion-referenced instruments be developed whenever programs designed specifically to effect specifiable selfconcept behaviors are to be evaluated. Data obtained from criterion-referenced tests will enable the educator to more effectively determine the degree to which students reach the behavioral outcomes set up as the objectives of the program. This approach will also permit the educator to provide his public with the accountability data they are beginning to demand from him.

SUMMARY

That the self literature is not only vast but also confusing was demonstrated in the first part of this paper, which examined the highlights of self theory. That social scientists tend to use the same term to mean different things and mean the same things when they use different terms was also made apparent when the definitions for selfconcept were surveyed. A model for conceiving of selfconcept was provided. Essentially, selfconcept was viewed as a generic construct composed of a number of evaluative and descriptive components. Phenomenal and nonphenomenal components also were seen as part of the model.

In the second part of the paper more than 50 currently available instruments purported to assess the selfconcept of young children were described and classified according to the subdivisions of five major assessment approaches. (It is anticipated that the categorization schema devised especially for this paper will be useful in the management of any large quantity of test information, regardless of its content.) In addition, suggestions were made to indicate which testing approaches in the opinion of the author deserved further scrutiny.

In the third and final part of the paper, several important observations were made and suggestions offered:

1. That it is probably not possible to produce a widely acceptable literary definition for selfconcept.
2. That selfconcept must be defined operationally as <u>that construct or set thereof assessed by the set of so-called selfconcept instruments</u>.
3. That selfconcept be regarded as merely a technical term for a field of study. Definitions were offered.

4. That it is inappropriate to attempt to validate a selfconcept measure by simply comparing it with another selfconcept measure. The component matrix discussed in the first part of the paper was used as a model for convergent and discriminant validation procedures.
5. That the bulk of currently available selfconcept tests are not likely to be of significant value to the educator concerned wither with the development or modification of specific educational programs for young children. It was recommended that for such needs criterion-referenced tests be developed.

In general, it is recommended that the social scientist re-examine his research efforts with respect to selfconcept assessment. The data and psychometric logic suggest strongly that several independent measures of self-concept must be employed before an accurate assessment of selfconcept can be achieved. More research is clearly needed to determine the relationship among the many measures of selfconcept. In short, the selfconcept area requires a"new look."

Footnotes

Wylie (1961) lists close to 1,000 references that deal primarily with selfconcept and its assessment. References that deal with other definitions of self were not necessarily included.

2. The vast literature that refers in some way to a diversely defined self surely must confuse the unsuspecting reader.

3. It is a purpose of this paper to convince readers to regard selfconcept as a highly general construct composed of diverse and sometimes unrelated subconstructs. The spelling employed here, though justifiable in its own right, serves more to signify this approach to selfconcept. As a matter of form, the spelling of selfconcept as employed in the title of a test or in a quotation by a particular author will be maintained in the original. Normally, the conversion of individual words into single ones occurs in three distinct stages. In the first stage, the separate words are placed together in simple contiguity (i.e., "self concept"). In the second stage, hyphens are used to convert the separate words into a single word--a combinational form--which then acts, for example, as an adjective or noun (i.e., "self-concept"). Finally, in the third stage, the hyphen is removed and the separate words are joined together (i.e., "selfconcept"). As a rule, a given stage terminates and another begins only after the general population has sufficient time to adapt to the preceeding change. For example, Nicholsen (1957) has indicated that "the conversion of a hyphened word into an unhyphened single one is desirable as soon as the novelty of the combination has worn off..." (p.245). Under ordinary circumstances, the term "selfconcept," which has appeared frequently in the professional literature in an hyphenated form at least since the late 1940s (see Raimy, 1948) should now be so familiar to the public as to warrant third-stage spelling. A survey of recently published standard dictionaries reveals, however, that professional lexicographers have not yet seen fit to employ even the hyphenated form of "selfconcept" in their work (a situation which has, no doubt, contributed to the inconsistent ways in which authors now spell selfconcept.)

4. In addition, English and English (1958) noted that there are nearly a thousand combined forms of words beginning with the term "self" (e.g., self-consciousness, self-esteem, self-regard, and so on).

5. In a comprehensive review of selfconcept assessment techniques, Wylie (1961) reported on only one measure which was employed to assess selfconcept in young children below the 4th grade.

6. Descartes had originally distinguished mind as knower, or subject of knowledge from what is known, or the object of knowledge.

7. Allport (1943) discusses these issues in a thought provoking article.

8. Descartes had reached the conclusion "I think, therefore I am."

9. Few, if any, contemporary psychologists would accept Dewey's view of psychology unaltered--it is a rather confining conception. Most, however, would agree that the study of self is an important, if not vital, subject area for social scientists to investigate.

10. Cooley thus indicates that, for him, the locus of the "I" is not the material body, but rather one's self-feelings. On the other hand, Titchener (1898) mentions a Dr. Mercer, who believed that "self" meant stomach. He felt that the alimentary organic sensations were most important in the perception of self.

11. It's interesting to compare Cooley's observations with Sarbin's (1952) more explicit "epistemogenic" theory of self-development.

12. Calkins (1915), like Dewey, attempted to draw attention to the self as a central conception for psychology.

13. The effects of such thinking were felt for a long time. Diggory (1966) has written recently that the main thesis of his text Self-Evaluation: Concepts and Studies, was that "psychology, the method of experimental thinking should and can be intruded into a field where it has so far not penetrated very deeply. This is the field of problems relating to the notion of self" (p. 1).

14. Cofer and Appley (1964) described the functions of the ego as follows: "The ego performs its task by (1) observing accurately what exists in the external world (perceiving), (2) recording these experiences carefully (remembering), and (3) modifying the external world in such a way as to satisfy the instinctual wishes (acting). Failing this last, the ego must hold off the discharge of energy until such modification can be brought about or an appropriate substitute found" (p. 609).

15. This conceptualization has found its way into assessment measures, especially those which compare selfconcept with ideal-selfconcept.

16. Furtmuller (1964), a close associate of Adler's, pointed out that "the working hypothesis (of Adler's psychology) was that the various actions and ideas of an individual could not be explained as caused by isolated psychic powers like drives, or motivated by certain isolated experiences like traumas, but only in connection with the whole of the individual's psychic picture" (p. 364). Thus, Adler's model of man was close to that conceived by Gestalt psychologists: the whole is more than the sum total of its parts and therefore cannot be explained by any partial process (Creikurs, 1963).

17. In Dreikur's (1963) analysis of Adlerian psychology, he indicated that there are three major tasks that everyone must face. First, he has to contribute in a useful way through his work. Second, he has to make friends with his fellow men and participate with them in common endeavors. Third, he has to establish a satisfactory relationship with a person of the opposite sex. A person is thought to be well adjusted if he can meet these problems in a satisfactory fashion. If he cannot, he is considered maladjusted.

18. Even though Freud laid the foundations for ego psychology, his psychology, like Jung's, was primarily an id psychology. Freud insisted that the ego had no energy of its own, and that its existence was dependent upon the id. Allport (1961) commented that Freud's conception of the ego left it "frail and relatively inconsequential. It ascribes to consciousness a passive and secondary role." Allport also suggested that it is this "one-sidedness that modern ego-psychology tries to correct." At issue, then, is the relative importance of unconscious and conscious forces to develop and maintain individual behavior. As Allport questioned: "Does the conscious layer have an autonomy and function of its own, or does it always serve the purposes and motives that are deeply imbedded in the unconscious?"

19. A case in point is seen in the emotional upheavals currently being experienced by children in California, which, in part result from their experiencing of the anxiety of their "godlike" parents during the recent earthquakes.

20. Peabody (1967) has argued persuasively that the trait (personality) judgment process normally confounds evaluative and descriptive aspects. When this confounding is controlled, Peabody claimed that the descriptive aspects were at least as important as the evaluative ones.

21. For example, Lecky (1969) argued that "the whole theory of testing rests upon the assumption that the judgement which we make on the basis of a small sample of behavior (the test) will agree with the judgments made by competent observers based on a larger sample of behavior" (p. 9).

22. A more extensive description of many of the instruments referred to has been provided in annotated bibliographies of self-concept measures. See, for example, Coller (1970), Johnson and Bommarito (1971), and Coller and Guthrie (1971). The Coller and Guthrie publication is a revised and summarized version of Coller's earlier paper and is published by the ERIC Clearinghouse on Tests, Measurements and Evaluation, (ERIC/TM), Educational Testing Service.

23. Note, that if the respondent was asked to assess the behavior as it occurred and not rely upon memory, the self-same instrument could conceivably be classified as a direct observational procedure.

24. It may be concluded, therefore, that it is incorrect to treat a measure as a projective technique simply becuase the respondent is unaware of the testing objectives. (The same is true of cloaked self-report measures.)

25. I'm indebted to J. Thomas Hastings for pointing out that the Parents' Report on Children's Behavior is probably a reactive measure for parents. That is, parents may develop a different set of expectations in respect to the future behavior of their children, especially for those behavioral dimensions emphasized in the measure. Whether or not the children will be affected appreciably by such changes remains to be seen.

26. Self-as-subject score is the self-referent score.

27. Brown discussed the possibility that white examiners may have negatively influenced the scores of the black Ss in this study. Zirkel (1971), in a recent review of ethnic studies relevant to selfconcept, reported mixed findings for those few studies which experimentally examined the too often ignored experimenter-subject variable.

28. The BIDSDCRT is now being employed by Educational Testing Service in a study of Head Start; over 1,000 children are being assessed for self

29. In a report by Cicirelli, et. al. (1969), this test is regarded as a "projective measure of the degree to which the child has a positive self-concept." (pp. 4-5). [Author's italics] By the definitions employed here this is a self-report measure, as it does not appear to tap the nonphenomenal self.

30. The How Much Like Me? scale has been used sparingly and has not been standardized. Private communication, Dysinger, 1970.

31. The use of the term "projective" in the Children's Projective Pictures of Self-Concept is interpreted as referring to an identification process. However, it should be noted that, for reasons explained earlier, some disagreement with the way this particular category of testing techniques is employed is anticipated.

32. A better term would be "projectable," which would be defined as all those standardized test situations that,, on the surface, appear to be capable of eliciting from S nonphenomenal behaviors. This solves a classification problem; namely, that of empirically demonstrating that a projective measure does indeed assess the nonphenomenal self.

33. If Campbell's (1957) schema was to be used here, measures in categories 1, 2, 3, and 6 would all be treated as test type "voluntary, indirect, free-response"; measures in category 4 would be test type "voluntary, direct, free-response" and measures in category 5 would be test type "voluntary, indirect, structured."

34. The authors of these instruments claimed that, among other things, their measures assessed selfconcept. Such claims were sufficient to meet the criteria of review for this paper.

35. An operational definition for any particular instrument should differ from this highly general definition; it should be more precise, for example. In practice, operational definitions have seldom been offered by the self-concept test constructor.

36. The subconstructs may be related in some way to selfconcept but may be correlationally unrelated to one another.

37. This statement is not completely true since it is thought that the cells of the matrix may be even further subdivided.

38. This, of course, is to be expected of researchers involved in correlational studies, and test designers interested in developing measures having high consistency.

39. It is currently popular to speak of achievement tests as being norm-referenced. The concept, however, may be applied to any measure that is standardized. This, of course, includes personality and motivation-type instruments.

40. Coller and Victor (1968) have developed a number of non-specific criterion-referenced tests which may be employed as an alternative model.

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